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Crisis costs and debtor discipline: the efficacy of public policy in sovereign debt crises

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Ms. Nancy P. Marion & Mr. Robert P Flood, 2006. "Getting Shut Out of the International Capital Markets - It Doesn’t Take Much," IMF Working Papers 2006/144, International Monetary Fund.
  2. Weinschelbaum, Federico & Wynne, Jose, 2005. "Renegotiation, collective action clauses and sovereign debt markets," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 47-72, September.
  3. Ghosal, Sayantan & Thampanishvong, Kannika, 2013. "Does strengthening Collective Action Clauses (CACs) help?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 68-78.
  4. Schumacher, Julian & Trebesch, Christoph & Enderlein, Henrik, 2021. "Sovereign defaults in court," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
  5. Benjamin Martin & Adrian Penalver, 2003. "The effect of payments standstills on yields and the maturity structure of international debt," Bank of England working papers 184, Bank of England.
  6. Marcus Miller & Dania Thomas, 2007. "Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The Judge, the Vultures and Creditor Rights," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(10), pages 1491-1509, October.
  7. Chamon, Marcos & Schumacher, Julian & Trebesch, Christoph, 2018. "Foreign-Law Bonds: Can They Reduce Sovereign Borrowing Costs?," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 114, pages 164-179.
  8. Enderlein, Henrik & Trebesch, Christoph & von Daniels, Laura, 2012. "Sovereign debt disputes: A database on government coerciveness during debt crises," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 250-266.
  9. Christoph Trebesch, 2019. "Resolving sovereign debt crises: the role of political risk," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(2), pages 421-444.
  10. Julian Schumacher & Christoph Trebesch & Henrik Enderlein, 2015. "What Explains Sovereign Debt Litigation?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(3).
  11. Michael P. Dooley & Sujata Verma, 2003. "Rescue Packages and Output Losses Following Crises," NBER Chapters, in: Managing Currency Crises in Emerging Markets, pages 125-146, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Corsetti, Giancarlo & Guimaraes, Bernardo & Roubini, Nouriel, 2006. "International lending of last resort and moral hazard: A model of IMF's catalytic finance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 441-471, April.
  13. Gai, Prasanna & Shin, Hyun Song, 2004. "Debt maturity structure with pre-emptive creditors," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 195-200, November.
  14. Kartik Anand & Prasanna Gai, 2019. "Pre-emptive sovereign debt restructuring and holdout litigation," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(2), pages 364-381.
  15. Powell, Andrew & Arozamena, Leandro, 2003. "Liquidity protection versus moral hazard: the role of the IMF," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(7), pages 1041-1063, December.
  16. Adrian Penalver, 2004. "How can the IMF catalyse private capital flows? A model," Bank of England working papers 215, Bank of England.
  17. Misa Tanaka, 2006. "Bank Loans Versus Bond Finance: Implications for Sovereign Debtors," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(510), pages 149-171, March.
  18. Tillmann, Peter, 2005. "Private sector involvement in the resolution of financial crises: How do markets react?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 114-132, October.
  19. Goderis, Benedikt & Wagner, Wolf, 2009. "Credit Derivatives and Sovereign Debt Crises," MPRA Paper 17314, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  20. Andrew Powell, 2002. "Countries with international payments´ difficulties: what can the IMF do?," Business School Working Papers veintitres, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
  21. Aitor Erce, 2013. "Sovereign debt crises: could an international court minimize them?," Globalization Institute Working Papers 142, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
  22. Prasanna Gai & Nicholas Vause, 2003. "Sovereign debt workouts with the IMF as delegated monitor - a common agency approach," Bank of England working papers 187, Bank of England.
  23. Jorge Fernández-Ruiz, 2004. "The Simple Case For Collective Action Clauses," Remef - Revista Mexicana de Economía y Finanzas Nueva Época REMEF (The Mexican Journal of Economics and Finance), Instituto Mexicano de Ejecutivos de Finanzas, IMEF, vol. 3(3), pages 237-248, Septiembr.
  24. Robert Flood & Nancy Marion, 2009. "Getting Shut Out of the International Capital Markets: It Doesn't Take Much," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(5), pages 879-889, November.
  25. Christoph Trebesch, 2009. "The Cost of Aggressive Sovereign Debt Policies: How Much is theprivate Sector Affected?," IMF Working Papers 2009/029, International Monetary Fund.
  26. Aitor Erce-Domínguez, 2006. "Using standstills to manage sovereign debt crises," Working Papers 0636, Banco de España.
  27. Mr. Se-Jik Kim, 2004. "Timing of International Bailouts," IMF Working Papers 2004/009, International Monetary Fund.
  28. Prasanna Gai, 2008. "Discussion of 'Promoting Liquidity: Why and How?'," RBA Annual Conference Volume (Discontinued), in: Paul Bloxham & Christopher Kent (ed.),Lessons from the Financial Turmoil of 2007 and 2008, Reserve Bank of Australia.
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