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Bankers on boards: *1: monitoring, conflicts of interest, and lender liability

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Cited by:

  1. Hsin-Yu Liang & Alan K. Reichert & Larry D. Wall, 2008. "The final frontier : the integration of banking and commerce. Part 1, the likely outcome of eliminating the barrier," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, vol. 93(1).
  2. Feess, Eberhard & Hege, Ulrich, 2003. "Safety monitoring, capital structure, and "financial responsibility"," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 323-339, September.
  3. Jiang, George J. & Liu, Chang, 2021. "Getting on board: The monitoring effect of institutional directors," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
  4. Eric Hilt, 2014. "History of American Corporate Governance: Law, Institutions, and Politics," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 6(1), pages 1-21, December.
  5. Carola Frydman & Eric Hilt, 2014. "Investment Banks as Corporate Monitors in the Early 20th Century United States," NBER Working Papers 20544, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Nachane, D M & Ghosh, Saibal & Ray, Partha, 2005. "Bank nominee directors and corporate performance: micro evidence for India," MPRA Paper 2707, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Takaoka, Sumiko & McKenzie, C.R., 2006. "The impact of bank entry in the Japanese corporate bond underwriting market," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 59-83, January.
  8. Colvin, Christopher L. & de Jong, Abe & Fliers, Philip T., 2015. "Predicting the past: Understanding the causes of bank distress in the Netherlands in the 1920s," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 97-121.
  9. Yiming Hu & Siqi Li & Thomas W. Lin & Shilei Xie, 2011. "Large creditors and corporate governance: the case of Chinese banks," Review of Accounting and Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 10(4), pages 332-367, November.
  10. Ghosh, Saibal, 2007. "Leverage, managerial monitoring and firm valuation: A simultaneous equation approach," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 84-98, June.
  11. Luo, Wei & Zhang, Yi & Zhu, Ning, 2011. "Bank ownership and executive perquisites: New evidence from an emerging market," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 352-370, April.
  12. Renee B. Adams & Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2010. "The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(1), pages 58-107, March.
  13. Azzam Islam, 2010. "Bank Ownership and Corporate Performance: Evidence from Egypt," Review of Middle East Economics and Finance, De Gruyter, vol. 5(3), pages 91-118, February.
  14. Byrd, Daniel T. & Mizruchi, Mark S., 2005. "Bankers on the board and the debt ratio of firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-2), pages 129-173, March.
  15. Baker, Malcolm & Gompers, Paul A, 2003. "The Determinants of Board Structure at the Initial Public Offering," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(2), pages 569-598, October.
  16. Daniel Ferreira & Miguel A. Ferreira & Beatriz Mariano, 2018. "Creditor Control Rights and Board Independence," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 73(5), pages 2385-2423, October.
  17. Saibal Ghosh, 2007. "Bank Debt Use and Firm Size: Indian Evidence," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 15-23, June.
  18. Kose John & Hamid Mehran & Yiming Qian, 2007. "Regulation, subordinated debt, and incentive features of CEO compensation in the banking industry," Staff Reports 308, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  19. Burak Güner, A. & Malmendier, Ulrike & Tate, Geoffrey, 2008. "Financial expertise of directors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 323-354, May.
  20. Ferreira, Daniel & Kirchmaier, Tom & Metzger, Daniel, 2011. "Boards of banks," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119078, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  21. Hilscher, Jens & Şişli-Ciamarra, Elif, 2013. "Conflicts of interest on corporate boards: The effect of creditor-directors on acquisitions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(C), pages 140-158.
  22. Guglielmo Barone & Litterio Mirenda & Sauro Mocetti, 2021. "Losing My Connection: The Dark Side of Bank–Firm Interlocking Directorates," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 88(350), pages 474-498, April.
  23. Charisse A. Gulosino & Elif ÅžiÅŸli Ciamarra, 2019. "Donors and Founders on Charter School Boards and Their Impact on Financial and Academic Outcomes," Education Finance and Policy, MIT Press, vol. 14(3), pages 441-471, Summer.
  24. Michael Carney & Eric Gedajlovic & Sujit Sur, 2011. "Corporate governance and stakeholder conflict," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 15(3), pages 483-507, August.
  25. Espenlaub, Susanne & Khurshed, Arif & Sitthipongpanich, Thitima, 2012. "Bank connections, corporate investment and crisis," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(5), pages 1336-1353.
  26. Shenghui Tong & Eddy Junarsin & Chuntao Li, 2015. "A Comparative Study of Chinese SOE Firm's Boards and Private Firm's Boards," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 16(2), pages 291-314, November.
  27. von Beschwitz, Bastian & Foos, Daniel, 2018. "Banks’ equity stakes and lending: Evidence from a tax reform," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 322-343.
  28. Lin, Xiaochi & Zhang, Yi & Zhu, Ning, 2009. "Does bank ownership increase firm value? Evidence from China," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 720-737, June.
  29. Carola Frydman & Eric Hilt & Lily Y. Zhou, 2015. "Economic Effects of Runs on Early "Shadow Banks": Trust Companies and the Impact of the Panic of 1907," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 123(4), pages 902-940.
  30. Brian Akins & David De Angelis & Maclean Gaulin, 2020. "Debt Contracting on Management," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(4), pages 2095-2137, August.
  31. Ruiz-Mallorquí, María Victoria & Santana-Martín, Domingo J., 2011. "Dominant institutional owners and firm value," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 118-129, January.
  32. Takanori Tanaka, 2009. "Managerial Entrenchment, Banker Distribution, and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Japan," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 09-02, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
  33. Noel Maurer & Stephen Haber, 2007. "Related Lending: Manifest Looting or Good Governance? Lessons from the Economic History of Mexico," NBER Chapters, in: The Decline of Latin American Economies: Growth, Institutions, and Crises, pages 213-242, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  34. Yasuda, Ayako, 2007. "Bank relationships and underwriter competition: Evidence from Japan," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 369-404, November.
  35. Firth, Michael & Lin, Chen & Wong, Sonia M.L., 2008. "Leverage and investment under a state-owned bank lending environment: Evidence from China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(5), pages 642-653, December.
  36. Agrawal, Anup & Chadha, Sahiba, 2005. "Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(2), pages 371-406, October.
  37. Andreani, Ettore & Dummann, Kathrin & Neuberger, Doris, 2009. "Composition of supervisory boards in Germany: Inside or outside control of banks?," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 103, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.
  38. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 2001. "Throwing Good Money after Bad? Board Connections and Conflicts in Bank Lending," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 02-12, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
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