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Optimal Selling Procedures with Fixed Costs
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Cited by:
- Marco Sahm, 2015. "Advance-Purchase Financing of Projects with Few Buyers," CESifo Working Paper Series 5560, CESifo.
- Ke-Wei Huang & Arun Sundararajan, 2011. "Pricing Digital Goods: Discontinuous Costs and Shared Infrastructure," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 22(4), pages 721-738, December.
- Ledyard, John O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2007.
"A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 441-466, March.
- Ledyard, John & Palfrey, Thomas, 2003. "A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments," Working Papers 1186, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Ellman, Matthew & Hurkens, Sjaak, 2019.
"Optimal crowdfunding design,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
- Matthew Ellman & Sjaak Hurkens, 2014. "Optimal Crowdfunding Design," Working Papers 14-21, NET Institute.
- Matthew Ellman & Sjaak Hurkens, 2016. "Optimal Crowdfunding Design," Working Papers 871, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Vincent Meisner & Pascal Pillath, 2024. "Monetizing digital content with network effects: A mechanism-design approach," Papers 2408.15196, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
- Barbieri Stefano & Malueg David A., 2010. "Profit-Maximizing Sale of a Discrete Public Good via the Subscription Game in Private-Information Environments," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-31, February.
- Meisner, Vincent & Pillath, Pascal, 2024. "Monetizing digital content with network effects: A mechanism-design approach," VfS Annual Conference 2024 (Berlin): Upcoming Labor Market Challenges 302417, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Nicholas C Bedard & Jacob K Goeree & Ningyi Sun, 2023. "Multivariate Majorization in Principal-Agents Models," Papers 2308.13804, arXiv.org.
- Andrej Woerner & Sander Onderstal & Arthur Schram, 2022.
"Comparing Crowdfunding Mechanisms: Introducing the Generalized Moulin-Shenker Mechanism,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
10081, CESifo.
- Andrej Woerner & Sander Onderstal & Arthur Schram, 2023. "Comparing Crowdfunding Mechanisms: Introducing the Generalized Moulin-Shenker Mechanism," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 464, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Simon Loertscher & Leslie M. Marx, 2022. "To sell public or private goods," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(3), pages 385-415, September.
- Gary-Bobo, Robert J. & Jaaidane, Touria, 2000.
"Polling mechanisms and the demand revelation problem,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 203-238, May.
- R. J. Gary-Bobo & T. Jaaidane, 1996. "Polling mechanisms and the demand revelation problem," THEMA Working Papers 96-31, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Jen Shang & Rachel Croson, 2009.
"A Field Experiment in Charitable Contribution: The Impact of Social Information on the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(540), pages 1422-1439, October.
- Jen Shang & Rachel Croson, 2009. "A Field Experiment in Charitable Contribution: The Impact of Social Information on the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(540), pages 1422-1439, October.
- Roland Strausz, 2017.
"A Theory of Crowdfunding: A Mechanism Design Approach with Demand Uncertainty and Moral Hazard,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(6), pages 1430-1476, June.
- Roland, Strausz, 2015. "A Theory of Crowdfunding - a mechanism design approach with demand uncertainty and moral hazard," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 527, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Roland Strausz, 2016. "A Theory of Crowdfunding - A Mechanism Design Approach with Demand Uncertainty and Moral Hazard," CESifo Working Paper Series 6100, CESifo.
- Strausz, Roland, 2016. "A Theory of Crowdfunding - a mechanism design approach with demand uncertainty and moral hazard," CEPR Discussion Papers 11222, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Marco Sahm, 2020. "Advance-Purchase Financing of Projects with Few Buyers," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 57(4), pages 909-933, December.
- Isabelle Brocas, 2008.
"Optimal choice of characteristics for a nonexcludable good,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(1), pages 283-304, March.
- Brocas, Isabelle, 2006. "Optimal Choice of Characteristics for a Non-Excludable Good," CEPR Discussion Papers 5704, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Isabelle Brocas, 2006. "Optimal Choice of Characteristics for a non-excludable Good," IEPR Working Papers 06.52, Institute of Economic Policy Research (IEPR).
- Vincent Meisner & Pascal Pillath, 2024. "Monetizing digital content with network effects: A mechanism-design approach," Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers 0049, Berlin School of Economics.
- Gilles Chemla & Katrin Tinn, 2020.
"Learning Through Crowdfunding,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(5), pages 1783-1801, May.
- Chemla, Gilles & Tinn, Katrin, 2016. "Learning through Crowdfunding," CEPR Discussion Papers 11363, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gilles Chemla & Katrin Tinn, 2020. "Learning Through Crowdfunding," Post-Print hal-03342460, HAL.
- Peter Norman, 2004. "Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 71(4), pages 1163-1188.
- Francisca Jiménez-Jiménez & Maria Virtudes Alba-Fernández & Cristina Martínez-Gómez, 2021. "Attracting the Right Crowd under Asymmetric Information: A Game Theory Application to Rewards-Based Crowdfunding," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(21), pages 1-23, October.
- Birulin, Oleksii, 2006. "Public goods with congestion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 129(1), pages 289-299, July.
- Menezes, Flavio M. & Monteiro, Paulo K. & Temimi, Akram, 2001. "Private provision of discrete public goods with incomplete information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 493-514, July.
- Andrea Buraschi & Francesca Cornelli, 2014. "The Economics of Donations and Enlightened Self†interest," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 20(1), pages 1-32, January.
- Norman,P., 2000. "Efficient mechanisms for public goods with use exclusions," Working papers 15, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Francesco Giovannoni & Toomas Hinnosaar, 2022. "Pricing Novel Goods," Papers 2208.04985, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2024.
- Strausz, Roland, 2017. "A Theory of Crowdfunding," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 2, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Qiang Liu & Xiaofeng Liu & Subramanian Balachander, 2021. "Crowdfunding Project Design: Optimal Product Menu and Funding Target," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 30(10), pages 3800-3811, October.
- Ma, Xuejing & Wang, Zetao & Liu, Hongju, 2022. "Do long-life customers pay more in pay-what-you-want pricing? Evidence from live streaming," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 998-1009.
- Sahm, Marco, 2015. "Advance-Purchase Financing of Projects with Few Buyers," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113122, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Andrej Woerner & Sander Onderstal & Arthur Schram, 2022.
"Comparing Crowdfunding Mechanisms: Introducing the Generalized Moulin-Shenker Mechanism,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
10081, CESifo.
- Andrej Woerner & Sander Onderstal & Arthur Schram, 2022. "Comparing Crowdfunding Mechanisms: Introducing the Generalized Moulin-Shenker Mechanism," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 22-084/I, Tinbergen Institute.
- ParimalKanti Bag & Santanu Roy, 2008.
"Repeated Charitable Contributions under Incomplete Information,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(525), pages 60-91, January.
- Parimal Kanti Bag & Santanu Roy, 2008. "Repeated Charitable Contributions under Incomplete Information," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(525), pages 60-91, January.
- Rustam Ibragimov, 2004. "Shifting paradigms: on the robustness of economic models to heavy-tailedness assumptions," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 105, Econometric Society.
- Stefano Barbieri & David A. Malueg, 2014.
"Increasing Fundraising Success by Decreasing Donor Choice,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 16(3), pages 372-400, June.
- Stefano Barbieri & David A. Malueg, 2010. "Increasing Fundraising Success by Decreasing Donor Choice," Working Papers 1006, Tulane University, Department of Economics.
- Sahm, Marco, 2016. "Advance-purchase financing of projects with few buyers," BERG Working Paper Series 118, Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group.
- Cornelli, Francesca & Buraschi, Andrea, 2002. "Donations," CEPR Discussion Papers 3488, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.