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Fair allocations in large economies
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Cited by:
- Eduardo M Azevedo & Eric Budish, 2019.
"Strategy-proofness in the Large,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 86(1), pages 81-116.
- Eduardo M. Azevedo & Eric Budish, 2017. "Strategy-proofness in the Large," NBER Working Papers 23771, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Calsamiglia, Xavier & Kirman, Alan, 1993.
"A Unique Informationally Efficient and Decentralized Mechanism with Fair Outcomes,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1147-1172, September.
- Xavier Calsamiglia & Alan Kirman, 1991. "A unique informationally efficient and decentralized mechanism with fair outcomes," Economics Working Papers 7, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Zhou, Lin, 1992. "Strictly fair allocations in large exchange economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 158-175.
- Cordoba, Jose M. & Hammond, Peter J., 1998.
"Asymptotically strategy-proof Walrasian exchange,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 185-212, December.
- Jose M. Cordoba & Peter J. Hammond, 1998. "Asymptotically Strategy-Proof Walrasian Exchange," Working Papers 98005, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Thomson, William, 2011. "Chapter Twenty-One - Fair Allocation Rules," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 21, pages 393-506, Elsevier.
- Nir Dagan, 1995.
"Consistent Solutions in Exchange Economies: a Characterization of the Price Mechanism,"
Economic theory and game theory
011, Nir Dagan.
- Nir Dagan, 1995. "Consistent solutions in exchange economies: A characterization of the price mechanism," Economics Working Papers 141, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Mongin, Philippe, 2019.
"Interview of Peter J. Hammond,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
1190, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Mongin, Philippe, 2019. "Interview of Peter J. Hammond," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 50, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
- Serge-Christophe Kolm, 1996. "The theory of justice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 13(2), pages 151-182, April.
- Roger Hartley & Richard Cornes, 2004. "Mixed sharing rules," Econometric Society 2004 Australasian Meetings 196, Econometric Society.
- Makowski, Louis & Ostroy, Joseph M., 1992.
"Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms in continuum economies : Characterization and existence,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-35.
- Louis Makowski & Joseph M. Ostroy, 1990. "Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms in Continuum Economies: Characterization and Existence," UCLA Economics Working Papers 607, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Klaus Nehring, 2004. "Incentive-Compatibility In Large Games," Working Papers 155, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Peter J. Hammond, 2003.
"Equal rights to trade and mediate,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(2), pages 181-193, October.
- Peter J. Hammond, 1999. "Equal Rights to Trade and Mediate," Working Papers 99019, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Louis Makowski & Joseph M. Ostroy, 1988. "Groves Mechanisms in Continuum Economies: Characterization and Existence," UCLA Economics Working Papers 518, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Lin Zhou, 1991. "Strictly Fair Allocations in Large Exchange Economies," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 972, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Makowski, Louis & Ostroy, Joseph M. & Segal, Uzi, 1999. "Efficient Incentive Compatible Economies Are Perfectly Competitive," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 169-225, April.
- Ambec, Stefan & Sprumont, Yves, 2002.
"Sharing a River,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 453-462, December.
- Ambec, S. & Sprumont, Y., 2000. "Sharing a River," Papers 00-06, Laval - Recherche en Energie.
- Ambec, S. & Sprumont, Y., 2000. "Sharing a River," Cahiers de recherche 2000-08, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- AMBEC, Steve & SPRUMONT, Yves, 2000. "Sharing a River," Cahiers de recherche 2000-08, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Ambec, Stefan & Sprumont, Yves, 2000. "Sharing a River," Cahiers de recherche 0006, GREEN.
- Susumu Cato, 2020. "Compatibility of egalitarian equivalence and envy-freeness in a continuum-agent economy," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(1), pages 97-103, April.
- Makowski, Louis & Ostroy, Joseph M., 1987.
"Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms and perfect competition,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 244-261, August.
- Louis Makowski & Joseph M. Ostroy, 1984. "Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms and Perfect Competition," UCLA Economics Working Papers 333, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Cato, Susumu, 2010. "Local envy-freeness and equal-income Walrasian allocations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 239-241, May.
- Guesnerie, R., 1995.
"The genealogy of modern theoretical public economics: From first best to second best,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 353-381, April.
- Roger Guesnerie, 1994. "The Genealogy of Modern Theoretical Public Economics: From First Best to Second Best," CESifo Working Paper Series 76, CESifo.
- Guesnerie, R., 1994. "The Genealogy of Modern Theoretical Public Economics: From first best to second best," DELTA Working Papers 94-25, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- Diamantaras, Dimitrios, 1991. "Envy-free and efficient allocations in large public good economies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 227-232, July.
- Sprumont, Yves & Zhou, Lin, 1999. "Pazner-Schmeidler rules in large societies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 321-339, April.
- Nehring, Klaus, 1998.
"Incentive-compatibility in large games,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 57-67, January.
- Nehring, K., 1995. "Incentive Compatibility in Large Games," Department of Economics 95-16, California Davis - Department of Economics.
- Nehring, K., 1995. "Incentive Compatibility in Large Games," Papers 95-16, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs.
- Fleurbaey, Marc & Maniquet, Francois, 1996. "Fair allocation with unequal production skills: The No Envy approach to compensation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 71-93, August.
- Harris Dellas & Klaus Nehring, 2003. "Incentive-Compatible And Efficient Resource Allocation In Large Economies: An Exact And Local Approach," Working Papers 213, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Chaturvedi, Rakesh, 2020. "Fairness and partial coercion in land assembly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 325-335.
- Cato, Susumu, 2010. "Local strict envy-freeness in large economies," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 319-322, May.
- Louis Makowski & Joseph M. Ostroy & Uzi Segal, 1995. "Perfect Competition as the Blueprint for Efficiency and Incentive Compatibility," UCLA Economics Working Papers 745, UCLA Department of Economics.