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Innovation timing games: a general framework with applications

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Mohammad Hossein Dehghani, 2014. "Strategic Technology Adoption under Technological Uncertainty," Iranian Economic Review (IER), Faculty of Economics,University of Tehran.Tehran,Iran, vol. 18(1), pages 1-31, Winter.
  2. Lukach, R. & Kort, P.M. & Plasmans, J.E.J., 2007. "Strategic R&D with Knowledge Spillovers and Endogenous Time to Complete," Discussion Paper 2007-38, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  3. Joao Vareda & Steffen Hoernig, 2007. "The race for telecoms infrastructure investment with bypass: can access regulation achieve the first best?," Nova SBE Working Paper Series wp524, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics.
  4. Alexander Matros & Vladimir Smirnov & Andrew Wait, 2024. "Sunk costs, entry and clustering," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 77(3), pages 747-782, May.
  5. Fouad Ouardighi & Matan Shnaiderman & Federico Pasin, 2014. "Research and Development with Stock-Dependent Spillovers and Price Competition in a Duopoly," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 161(2), pages 626-647, May.
  6. Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew, 2021. "Preemption with a second-mover advantage," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 294-309.
  7. Jan-Henrik Steg, 2018. "On Preemption in Discrete and Continuous Time," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 918-938, December.
  8. Bobtcheff, Catherine & Mariotti, Thomas, 2012. "Potential competition in preemption games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 53-66.
  9. Ruiz-Aliseda, Francisco, 2016. "Preemptive investments under uncertainty, credibility and first mover advantages," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 123-137.
  10. Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew & Xu, Rong, 2018. "Timing of entry with heterogeneous firms," Working Papers 2018-11, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
  11. Riedel, Frank & Steg, Jan-Henrik, 2017. "Subgame-perfect equilibria in stochastic timing games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 36-50.
  12. Francis Bloch & Simona Fabrizi & Steffen Lippert, 2015. "Learning and collusion in new markets with uncertain entry costs," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(2), pages 273-303, February.
  13. Ozdenoren, Emre & Hoppe-Wewetzer, Heidrun C. & Katsenos, Georgios, 2019. "Experimentation, Learning, and Preemption," CEPR Discussion Papers 13483, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  14. Cumbul, Eray, 2021. "Stackelberg versus Cournot oligopoly with private information," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
  15. Gianluca Femminis & Gianmaria Martini, 2010. "Spillovers, Disclosure Lags, and Incentives to Innovate: Do Oligopolies Over-Invest in R&D?," Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali, Vita e Pensiero, Pubblicazioni dell'Universita' Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, vol. 118(1), pages 47-76.
  16. Wang, Rong-Kuan & Hu, Die, 2017. "Time-cost substitutability, earlycutting threat, and innovation timing," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 88-91.
  17. Dawid, Herbert & Kopel, Michael & Kort, Peter M., 2010. "Innovation threats and strategic responses in oligopoly markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 203-222, August.
  18. Graeme Guthrie, 2006. "Regulating Infrastructure: The Impact on Risk and Investment," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(4), pages 925-972, December.
  19. Emmanuel Dechenaux & Brent Goldfarb & Scott Shane & Marie Thursby, 2008. "Appropriability and Commercialization: Evidence from MIT Inventions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(5), pages 893-906, May.
  20. Florian Diekert, 2012. "Growth Overfishing: The Race to Fish Extends to the Dimension of Size," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 52(4), pages 549-572, August.
  21. Kretschmer, Tobias & Muehlfeld, Katrin, 2006. "Co-opetition and prelaunch in standard-setting for developing technologies," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19843, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  22. Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew, 2015. "Innovation in a generalized timing game," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 23-33.
  23. Rossella Argenziano & Philipp Schmidt-Dengler, 2014. "Clustering In N-Player Preemption Games," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(2), pages 368-396, April.
  24. Bobtcheff, Catherine & Mariotti, Thomas & Levy, Raphaël, 2021. "Negative results in science: Blessing or (winner’s) curse," TSE Working Papers 21-1202, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  25. Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2005. "First-mover disadvantage," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 127, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  26. Jan-Henrik Steg, 2015. "Symmetric Equilibria in Stochastic Timing Games," Papers 1507.04797, arXiv.org, revised May 2018.
  27. Argenziano, Rossella & Schmidt-Dengler, Philipp, 2012. "Inefficient entry order in preemption games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(6), pages 445-460.
  28. repec:vuw:vuwscr:18946 is not listed on IDEAS
  29. Vives, Xavier, 2005. "Games with strategic complementarities: New applications to industrial organization," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(7-8), pages 625-637, September.
  30. Kerstan, Sven & Kretschmer, Tobias & Muehlfeld, Katrin, 2012. "The dynamics of pre-market standardization," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 105-119.
  31. Boyarchenko, Svetlana & Levendorskiĭ, Sergei, 2014. "Preemption games under Lévy uncertainty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 354-380.
  32. Herbert Dawid & Serhat Gezer, 2022. "Markov Perfect Equilibria in Multi-Mode Differential Games with Endogenous Timing of Mode Transitions," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 363-393, June.
  33. Femminis Gianluca & Martini Gianmaria, 2010. "First-Mover Advantage in a Dynamic Duopoly with Spillover," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-46, November.
  34. Sun Chia-Hung, 2020. "Timing of Adopting a Flexible Manufacturing System and Product Differentiation," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 20(2), pages 1-17, April.
  35. repec:esx:essedp:741 is not listed on IDEAS
  36. Hoppe-Wewetzer, Heidrun & Katsenos, Georgios & Ozdenoren, Emre, 2023. "The effects of rivalry on scientific progress under public vs private learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
  37. Herweg, Fabian, 2007. "Can price discrimination lead to product differentiation? A vertical differentiation model," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 2/2007, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
  38. Guthrie, Graeme, 2006. "Regulating Infrastructure: The Impact on Risk and Investment," Working Paper Series 18946, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
  39. Rossella Argenziano & Philipp Schmidt-Dengler, 2014. "Clustering In N-Player Preemption Games," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(2), pages 368-396, 04.
  40. Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew, 2018. "Blocking in a timing game with asymmetric players," Working Papers 2018-05, University of Sydney, School of Economics, revised May 2019.
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