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Per unit vs. ad valorem royalties under asymmetric information

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Cited by:

  1. Chien-Shu Tsai & Ting-Chung Tsai & Po-Sheng Ko & Chien-Hui Lee & Jen-Yao Lee & Yu-Lin Wang, 2019. "On the Sustainability of Technology Licensing Under Asymmetric Information Game," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(24), pages 1-15, December.
  2. Arijit Mukherjee & Aniruddha Bagchi, 2020. "Information Disclosure through Technology Licensing," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(3), pages 1-8, September.
  3. Sen Neelanjan & Bhattacharya Sukanta, 2017. "Technology Licensing between Rival Firms in Presence of Asymmetric Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(1), pages 1-35, January.
  4. Cuihong Fan & Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2016. "Optimal Licensing of Non-Drastic and (Super-)Drastic Innovations: The Case of the Inside Patent Holder," Discussion Paper Series 1610, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
  5. Arman Yalvac Aksoy & Catherine Beaudry, 2021. "How are companies paying for university research licenses? Empirical evidence from university-firm technology transfer," The Journal of Technology Transfer, Springer, vol. 46(6), pages 2051-2121, December.
  6. Cheng‐Tai Wu & Tsung‐Sheng Tsai, 2024. "Patent licensing for signaling the cost‐reduction innovation: The case of the insider innovator," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 26(1), February.
  7. Fan, Cuihong & Jun, Byoung Heon & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2015. "Licensing Innovations: The Case of the Inside Patent Holder," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 510, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  8. Hao Xu & Deqing Tan, 2023. "Optimal Abatement Technology Licensing in a Dynamic Transboundary Pollution Game: Fixed Fee Versus Royalty," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 61(3), pages 905-935, March.
  9. Liu Liu & Ying Yuan & Xiaoya Wang & Hongfu Huang, 2022. "Strategic Licensing of Green Technologies to a Brown Rival: A Game Theoretical Analysis," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 10(23), pages 1-21, November.
  10. Cheng-Tai Wu & Cheng-Hau Peng & Tsung-Sheng Tsai, 2021. "Signaling in Technology Licensing with a Downstream Oligopoly," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 58(4), pages 531-559, June.
  11. Yang, Le & Huang, Zining, 2023. "Quality-improving licensing of an outside innovator in a mixed Cournot duopoly," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
  12. Fan, Cuihong & Jun, Byoung Heon & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2018. "Optimal licensing of technology in the face of (asymmetric) competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 32-53.
  13. Junghee Lee & Vish Krishnan & Hyoduk Shin, 2020. "Business Models for Technology-Intensive Supply Chains," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(5), pages 2120-2139, May.
  14. John S. Heywood & Lu Xu & Guangliang Ye, 2019. "How does a public innovator license a foreign rival?," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 78-95, March.
  15. Colombo, Stefano & Filippini, Luigi, 2014. "Licensing and innovation: A comment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(3), pages 353-356.
  16. Cuihong Fan & Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2018. "Optimal licensing under incomplete information: the case of the inside patent holder," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 66(4), pages 979-1005, December.
  17. Yan, Qingyou & Yang, Le, 2018. "Optimal licensing schemes for a mixed ownership firm when facing uncertain R&D outcomes and technology spillover," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 550-572.
  18. John Heywood & Zheng Wang, 2015. "How to license a transport innovation," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 55(2), pages 485-500, December.
  19. Aika Monden & Katsuyoshi Takashima & Yusuke Zennyo, 2021. "Revenue‐Sharing Contracts under Demand Uncertainty in Shopping Center," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 49(2), pages 556-573, June.
  20. Siyu Ma & Debapriya Sen & Yair Tauman, 2024. "Optimal patent licensing: from three to two part tariffs," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 78(4), pages 1233-1273, December.
  21. Stefano Colombo & Luigi Filippini, 2016. "Revenue royalties," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 118(1), pages 47-76, May.
  22. Manel Antelo & Antonio Sampayo, 2024. "Licensing of a new technology by an outside and uninformed licensor," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 142(2), pages 111-162, July.
  23. Ma, Siyu & Sen, Debapriya & Tauman, Yair, 2022. "Optimal patent licensing: from three to two part tariffs," MPRA Paper 111624, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  24. Masashi Umezawa, 2022. "Optimal two-part tariff licensing in a Stackelberg duopoly," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 42(2), pages 629-642.
  25. Gelves, Juan Alejandro & Heywood, John S., 2016. "How does a mixed ownership firm license a patent?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 278-284.
  26. Marta Montinaro & Rupayan Pal & Marcella Scrimitore, 2020. "Per Unit and Ad Valorem Royalties in a Patent Licensing Game," Working Papers 2020.14, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  27. Fan, Cuihong & Jun, Byoung Heon & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2018. "Per unit vs. ad valorem royalty licensing," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 71-75.
  28. Montinaro, Marta & Scrimitore, Marcella, 2019. "Per unit and ad valorem royalties in a patent licensing game," MPRA Paper 96642, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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