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Weak entrants are welcome

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Laura Magazzini & Fabio Pammolli & Gianluca Papa & Nicola Carmine Salerno, 2005. "Generici vs. Branded: confronto internazionale su prodotti off-patent rimborsati dal SSN," Working Papers CERM 01-2005, Competitività, Regole, Mercati (CERM).
  2. Hiroshi Kitamura, 2008. "Exclusionary Vertical Contracts with Multiple Entrants," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 08-39, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
  3. Jun, Byoung Heon & Park, In-Uck, 2010. "Anti-Limit Pricing," Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 51(2), pages 1-22, December.
  4. Cao, Zong-Hong & Zhou, Yong-Wu & Zhao, Ju & Li, Chang-Wen, 2015. "Entry mode selection and its impact on an incumbent supply chain coordination," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 1-13.
  5. Heide Coenen, 2000. "Network Effects in Telecommunications: When Entrants are Welcome," Discussion Papers 241, Government Institute for Economic Research Finland (VATT).
  6. Ishibashi, Ikuo, 2003. "A note on credible spatial entry deterrence," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 283-289, February.
  7. Murooka, Takeshi, 2013. "A note on credible spatial preemption in an entry–exit game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 26-28.
  8. Magazzini, Laura & Pammolli, Fabio & Riccaboni, Massimo, 2004. "Dynamic Competition in Pharmaceuticals: Patent Expiry, Generic Penetration, and Industry Structure," MPRA Paper 15968, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Aidan Hollis, 2003. "The Anti-Competitive Effects of Brand-Controlled "Pseudo- Generics" in the Canadian Pharmaceutical Market," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 29(1), pages 21-31, March.
  10. Zhou, Yong-Wu & Cao, Zong-Hong & Zhong, Yuanguang, 2015. "Pricing and alliance selection for a dominant retailer with an upstream entry," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 243(1), pages 211-223.
  11. Junichiro Ishida & Toshihiro Matsumura & Noriaki Matsushima, 2011. "Market Competition, R&D And Firm Profits In Asymmetric Oligopoly," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(3), pages 484-505, September.
  12. Ikuo Ishibashi & Noriaki Matsushima, 2006. "Inviting entrants may help incumbent firms," Discussion Papers 2006-46, Kobe University, Graduate School of Business Administration.
  13. Yenipazarli, Arda, 2021. "Downstream entry revisited: Economic effects of entry in vertically-related markets," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 103(C).
  14. Luciano Fanti & Domenico Buccella, 2017. "Profit raising entry effects in network industries with Corporate Social Responsibility," Economics and Business Letters, Oviedo University Press, vol. 6(3), pages 59-68.
  15. Arijit Mukherjee & Achintya Ray, 2014. "Entry, Profit and Welfare under Asymmetric R&D Costs," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 82(3), pages 284-295, June.
  16. Kitamura, Hiroshi, 2010. "Exclusionary vertical contracts with multiple entrants," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 213-219, May.
  17. Laura Magazzini & Fabio Pammolli & Massimo Riccaboni, 2004. "Dynamic competition in pharmaceuticals," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 5(2), pages 175-182, May.
  18. Toshihiro Matsumura & Noriaki Matsushima, 2009. "Cost differentials and mixed strategy equilibria in a Hotelling model," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 43(1), pages 215-234, March.
  19. Ashiya, M., 1999. "Brand Proliferation is Useless to Deter Entry," ISER Discussion Paper 0476, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  20. Yi-Ling Cheng & Takatoshi Tabuchi, 2018. "Product Proliferation and First Mover Advantage in a Multiproduct Duopoly," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1091, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  21. Ashiya, Masahiro, 2000. "Weak entrants are welcome," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 975-984, August.
  22. Xiao, Tiaojun & Qi, Xiangtong, 2010. "Strategic wholesale pricing in a supply chain with a potential entrant," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 202(2), pages 444-455, April.
  23. Byford, Martin C. & Gans, Joshua S., 2019. "Strengthening a weak rival for a fight," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 1-17.
  24. Istaitieh, Abdulaziz & Rodriguez-Fernandez, Jose M., 2006. "Factor-product markets and firm's capital structure: A literature review," Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 49-75.
  25. Bong‐Ju Kim & Inho Chung, 2010. "Inter‐Market Competition Through Bundling In The Presence Of Cost Advantage," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 61(1), pages 116-132, March.
  26. Abdulaziz Istaitieh & José M. Rodríguez‐Fernández, 2006. "Factor‐product markets and firm's capital structure: A literature review," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(1), pages 49-75.
  27. Hattori, Keisuke & Yamada, Mai, 2020. "Welfare Implications of Sequential Entry with Heterogeneous Firms," MPRA Paper 103422, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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