Exclusionary Vertical Contracts with Multiple Entrants
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More about this item
Keywords
Vertical Relation; Exclusive Dealing; Multiple Entrants; Antitrust Policy.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2009-01-03 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-MIC-2009-01-03 (Microeconomics)
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