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Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Evolutionary Stability

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Herold, Florian & Kuzmics, Christoph, 2020. "The evolution of taking roles," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 38-63.
  2. Penélope Hernández & Bernhard von Stengel, 2014. "Nash Codes for Noisy Channels," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 62(6), pages 1221-1235, December.
  3. Leonardo Becchetti & Fabio Pisani & Luca Raffaele, 2023. "Co-planning and co-design as progress in the implementation of welfare services," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 70(3), pages 301-322, September.
  4. Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2003. "Long Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1619-1660, November.
    • Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2002. "Long Cheap Talk," Discussion Paper Series dp284, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, revised Nov 2002.
  5. Paola Manzini & Abdolkarim Sadrieh & Nicolaas J. Vriend, 2009. "On Smiles, Winks and Handshakes as Coordination Devices," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(537), pages 826-854, April.
  6. Blume, Andreas & Arnold, Tone, 2004. "Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 240-259, February.
  7. Banerjee, Abhijit & Weibull, Jorgen W., 2000. "Neutrally Stable Outcomes in Cheap-Talk Coordination Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 1-24, July.
  8. Jäger, Gerhard & Metzger, Lars P. & Riedel, Frank, 2011. "Voronoi languages," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 517-537.
  9. Förster, Manuel & Riedel, Frank, 2016. "Distorted Voronoi languages," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 458, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
  10. Jason McKenzie Alexander & Brian Skyrms & Sandy Zabell, 2012. "Inventing New Signals," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 129-145, March.
  11. Warneryd, Karl, 1991. "Evolutionary stability in unanimity games with cheap talk," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 375-378, August.
  12. Sobel, Joel, 2017. "A note on pre-play communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 477-486.
  13. Pawlowitsch, Christina, 2008. "Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal signaling system," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 203-226, May.
  14. Christina Pawlowitsch, 2006. "Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal proto-language.An approach based on the replicator dynamics," Vienna Economics Papers 0604, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  15. Anderlini, Luca, 1999. "Communication, Computability, and Common Interest Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 1-37, April.
  16. Heller, Yuval & Kuzmics, Christoph, 2024. "Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 51-76.
  17. Jonathan Bendor & Piotr Swistak, 1998. "Evolutionary Equilibria: Characterization Theorems and Their Implications," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 99-159, October.
  18. Toshiji Kawagoe & Hirokazu Takizawa, 2005. "Why Lying Pays: Truth Bias in the Communication with Conflicting Interests," Experimental 0503005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  19. Jean-François Laslier, 2023. "Universalization and altruism," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 60(4), pages 579-594, May.
  20. Toshiji Kawagoe & Hirokazu Takizawa, 2005. "Why Lying Pays: Truth Bias in the Communication with Conflicting Interests," Discussion papers 05018, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
  21. Heiner, Ronald Asher, 2002. "Robust Evolution Of Contingent Cooperation In Pure One-Shot Prisoners' Dilemmas. Part I: Vulnerable Contingent Participators Versus Stable Contingent Cooperators," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2002-09, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
  22. Arifovic, Jasmina & Eaton, B. Curtis, 1998. "The evolution of type communication in a sender/receiver game of common interest with cheap talk," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 22(8-9), pages 1187-1207, August.
  23. Brian Skyrms, 2003. "Signals, Evolution and the Explanatory Power of Transient Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000799, David K. Levine.
  24. Jäger, Gerhard & Koch-Metzger, Lars & Riedel, Frank, 2011. "Voronoi languages. Equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 420, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
  25. Chen, Ying, 2011. "Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 401-424, March.
  26. Olszewski, Wojciech, 2006. "Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 128(1), pages 164-186, May.
  27. Ross Cressman & William Sandholm & Christine Taylor, 2012. "Preface: Second DGAA Special Issue on Evolutionary Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 1-3, March.
  28. Sobel, Joel, 2000. "Economists' Models of Learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 241-261, October.
  29. Güth, Werner, 1997. "Specific institutional aspects of international cooperation: A game theoretic account," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1997,104, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
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