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Information Transmission When the Informed Party Is Confused

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "The expert problem: a survey," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 303-331, November.
  2. Ying Chen & Sidartha Gordon, 2015. "Information transmission in nested sender–receiver games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(3), pages 543-569, April.
  3. Bijkerk, Suzanne H. & Karamychev, Vladimir & Swank, Otto H., 2018. "When words are not enough," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 294-314.
  4. Frédéric Koessler & Françoise Forges, 2008. "Multistage Communication With And Without Verifiable Types," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 10(02), pages 145-164.
  5. Ottaviani, Marco & Sorensen, Peter Norman, 2006. "Professional advice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 120-142, January.
  6. Jesse Bull & Joel Watson, 2019. "Statistical evidence and the problem of robust litigation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 50(4), pages 974-1003, December.
  7. Lai, Ernest K., 2014. "Expert advice for amateurs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 1-16.
  8. Ascensión Andina-Díaz, 2015. "Competition and uncertainty in a paper’s news desk," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 116(1), pages 77-93, September.
  9. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/5adcidkke9omt0s9p6m01j1rh is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Goltsman, Maria & Pavlov, Gregory, 2014. "Communication in Cournot oligopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 152-176.
  11. Harbaugh, Richmond & To, Theodore, 2020. "False modesty: When disclosing good news looks bad," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 43-55.
  12. Jeahan Jung & Jeong Yoo Kim, 2024. "Cheap Talk with Transparent and Monotone Motives from a Seller to an Informed Buyer," Games, MDPI, vol. 15(3), pages 1-20, May.
  13. Murali Agastya & Parimal Kanti Bag & Indranil Chakraborty, 2014. "Communication and authority with a partially informed expert," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(1), pages 176-197, March.
  14. Francisco Silva, 2020. "Self-evaluations," Documentos de Trabajo 554, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
  15. Chen, Ying, 2012. "Value of public information in sender–receiver games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 114(3), pages 343-345.
  16. Alderighi, Marco & Nicolini, Marcella, 2022. "Strategic information disclosure in vertical markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
  17. Junichiro Ishida & Takashi Shimizu, 2009. "Cheap Talk with an Informed Receiver," ISER Discussion Paper 0746r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jun 2015.
  18. Oded Berman & Mohammad M. Fazel-Zarandi & Dmitry Krass, 2019. "Truthful Cheap Talk: Why Operational Flexibility May Lead to Truthful Communication," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(4), pages 1624-1641, April.
  19. Maxim Ivanov, 2024. "Perfect robust implementation by private information design," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 78(3), pages 753-787, November.
  20. Pedro M. Gardete & Yakov Bart, 2018. "Tailored Cheap Talk: The Effects of Privacy Policy on Ad Content and Market Outcomes," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 37(5), pages 733-752, September.
  21. Yasuyuki Miyahara & Hitoshi Sadakane, 2020. "Communication Enhancement through Information Acquisition by Uninformed Player," KIER Working Papers 1050, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  22. Junichiro Ishida & Takashi Shimizu, 2019. "Cheap talk when the receiver has uncertain information sources," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(2), pages 303-334, September.
  23. Aurora García-Gallego & Penélope Hernández-Rojas & Amalia Rodrigo-González, 2019. "Efficient coordination in the lab," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 14(1), pages 175-201, March.
  24. Ying Chen & Sidartha Gordon, 2014. "Information Transmission in Nested Sender-Receiver Games," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-00973071, HAL.
  25. Ascensión Andina‐Díaz, 2012. "Screening and Signaling in Communication," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 114(2), pages 480-499, June.
  26. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/5adcidkke9omt0s9p6m01j1rh is not listed on IDEAS
  27. Amir Habibi, 2023. "Communicating Preferences to Improve Recommendations," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 394, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
  28. Sandeep Baliga & Stephen Morris, 1998. "Cheap Talk and Co-ordination with Payoff Uncertainty," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1203, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  29. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/5adcidkke9omt0s9p6m01j1rh is not listed on IDEAS
  30. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/5adcidkke9omt0s9p6m01j1rh is not listed on IDEAS
  31. Ying Chen & Sidartha Gordon, 2014. "Information Transmission in Nested Sender-Receiver Games," SciencePo Working papers hal-00973071, HAL.
  32. Boleslavsky, Raphael & Lewis, Tracy R., 2016. "Evolving influence: Mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 110-134.
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