IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/eee/eecrev/v49y2005i7p1891-1913.html
   My bibliography  Save this item

Bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions: An experimental study

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Paul Pezanis-Christou & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2003. "Elicited bid functions in (a)symmetric first-price auctions," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 578.03, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  2. Kirchkamp, Oliver & Reiß, J. Philipp, 2004. "The overbidding-myth and the underbidding-bias in first-price auctions," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 04-32, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  3. Elbittar, Alexander, 2009. "Impact of valuation ranking information on bidding in first-price auctions: A laboratory study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 75-85, January.
  4. Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Kröger, Sabine, 2008. "Price formation in a sequential selling mechanism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(3-4), pages 832-843, September.
  5. Georganas, Sotiris & Kagel, John, 2011. "Asymmetric auctions with resale: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 359-371, January.
  6. Jason Shachat & J. Todd Swarthout, 2010. "Procurement Auctions for Differentiated Goods," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 7(1), pages 6-22, March.
  7. repec:wyi:journl:002123 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Sonsino, Doron, 2004. "Comparative study of one-bid versus two-bid auctions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(4), pages 561-583, August.
  9. Chernomaz, Kirill, 2012. "On the effects of joint bidding in independent private value auctions: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 690-710.
  10. Grebe, Tim & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Kröger, Sabine, 2016. "“Buy-It-Now” or “Sell-It-Now” auctions: Effects of changing bargaining power in sequential trading mechanisms," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 27-30.
  11. Jason Shachat & Lijia Wei, 2012. "Procuring Commodities: First-Price Sealed-Bid or English Auctions?," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 31(2), pages 317-333, March.
  12. Güth Werner & Königstein Manfred & Ivanova-Stenzel Radosveta & Strobel Martin, 2002. "Bid Functions in Auctions and Fair Division Games: Experimental Evidence," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 3(4), pages 461-484, December.
  13. Joel O. Wooten & Joan M. Donohue & Timothy D. Fry & Kathleen M. Whitcomb, 2020. "To Thine Own Self Be True: Asymmetric Information in Procurement Auctions," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 29(7), pages 1679-1701, July.
  14. Enikő Kácsor, 2021. "Modelling Bidding Behaviour on German Photovoltaic Auctions," Energies, MDPI, vol. 14(2), pages 1-32, January.
  15. Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Ro’i Zultan, 2014. "Auction Mechanisms And Bidder Collusion: Bribes, Signals And Selection," Working Papers 1406, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
  16. Argenton, Cédric & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Müller, Wieland, 2024. "Cournot meets Bayes-Nash: A discontinuity in behavior in finitely repeated duopoly games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 1-12.
  17. Guth, Werner & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta, 2003. "Asymmetric auction experiments with(out) commonly known beliefs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 195-199, August.
  18. Rodney Garratt & Mark Walker & John Wooders, 2012. "Behavior in second-price auctions by highly experienced eBay buyers and sellers," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 15(1), pages 44-57, March.
  19. Kirill Chernomaz, 2014. "Adaptive learning in an asymmetric auction: genetic algorithm approach," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 9(1), pages 27-51, April.
  20. F. Javier Otamendi & Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carrillo, 2018. "Sequential Auctions with Capacity Constraints: An Experimental Investigation," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(1), pages 1-31, March.
  21. Miguel A. Fonseca & Francesco Giovannoni & Miltiadis Makris, 2020. "Auctions with external incentives: experimental evidence," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(4), pages 1003-1043, December.
  22. Leufkens, Kasper & Peeters, Ronald, 2007. "Synergies are a reason to prefer first-price auctions!," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 64-69, October.
  23. Mürüvvet Büyükboyacı, 2016. "A Designer'S Choice Between Single-Prize And Parallel Tournaments," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(4), pages 1774-1789, October.
  24. Veronika Grimm & Friederike Mengel & Giovanni Ponti & Lari Arthur Viianto, 2006. "Investment Incentives in Auctions: An Experiment," Working Paper Series in Economics 26, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
  25. Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Zultan, Ro’i, 2017. "Collusion and information revelation in auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 84-102.
  26. Argenton, Cédric & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Müller, Wieland, 2024. "Cournot meets Bayes-Nash : A discontinuity in behavior in finitely repeated duopoly games," Other publications TiSEM 603ef683-1dca-4c30-b7e8-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  27. Wanchang Zhang, 2022. "Auctioning Multiple Goods without Priors," Papers 2204.13726, arXiv.org.
  28. Güth Werner, 2014. "Institutional Regulation of Public Provision," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 81-94, March.
  29. A. Alexander Elbittar, 2005. "Impact of Valuation Ranking Information on Bidding in First-Price," Microeconomics 0508008, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  30. Sheng Li & Peter Philips, 2012. "Construction Procurement Auctions: Do Entrant Bidders Employ More Aggressive Strategies than Incumbent Bidders?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 40(3), pages 191-205, May.
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.