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Contract renegotiation in models of asymmetric information

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Salvatore Piccolo & David Martimort, 2006. "The Strategic Value of Incomplete Contracting in a Competing Hierarchies Environment," CSEF Working Papers 160, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 08 Dec 2006.
  2. Graziano, Clara, 1995. "Cost observability and renegotiation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 359-372, December.
  3. Robert Rich & Joseph Tracy, 2013. "Early Contract Renegotiation: An Analysis of US Labor Contracts, 1970-1995," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(4), pages 825-842.
  4. Dan Anderberg & Carlo Perroni, "undated". "Renegotiation of Social Contracts by Majority Rule," EPRU Working Paper Series 00-15, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  5. Alessandro Cigno & Mizuki Komura & Annalisa Luporini, 2017. "Self-enforcing family rules, marriage and the (non)neutrality of public intervention," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 30(3), pages 805-834, July.
  6. Krasa, Stefan, 1999. "Unimprovable Allocations in Economies with Incomplete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 144-168, July.
  7. Christophe GODLEWSKI, 2018. "The effects of bank loan renegotiation on corporate policies and performance," Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center 2018-01, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg.
  8. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 169-188, January.
  9. Thakor, Anjan V., 1996. "The design of financial systems: An overview," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(5), pages 917-948, June.
  10. Neeman, Zvika & Pavlov, Gregory, 2008. "Renegotiation-Proof Mechanism Design," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275717, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
  11. Christophe J. GODLEWSKI, 2017. "Initial conditions and the private debt renegotiation process," Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center 2017-03, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg.
  12. Christophe J. GODLEWSKI, 2014. "What drives the dynamics of bank debt renegotiation in Europe? A survival analysis approach," Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center 2014-01, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg.
  13. Godlewski, Christophe J., 2014. "The determinants of multiple bank loan renegotiations in Europe," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 275-286.
  14. Jay Pil Choi & Christodoulos Stefanadis, 2018. "Sequential innovation, naked exclusion, and upfront lump-sum payments," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(4), pages 891-915, June.
  15. David Martimort & Salvatore Piccolo, 2010. "The Strategic Value of Quantity Forcing Contracts," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 204-229, February.
  16. Chan, Chia-Chung & Lin, Bing-Huei & Chang, Yung-Ho & Liao, Wei-Chen, 2013. "Does bank relationship matter for corporate risk-taking? Evidence from listed firms in Taiwan," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 323-338.
  17. Michael R. Roberts & Michael Schwert, 2020. "Interest Rates and the Design of Financial Contracts," NBER Working Papers 27195, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. Christodoulos Stefanadis, 2016. "Naked Exclusion and the Volatility of Innovation," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 39-50, August.
  19. Chen, Bin R., 2015. "Subjective performance feedback, ability attribution, and renegotiation-proof contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 155-174.
  20. José Valente & Mário Augusto & José Murteira, 2022. "Bargaining power and renegotiation of small private debt contracts," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 485-510, December.
  21. Fohlin, Caroline, 1999. "Universal Banking in Pre-World War I Germany: Model or Myth?," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 305-343, October.
  22. Nikolaev, Valeri V., 2018. "Scope for renegotiation in private debt contracts," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 270-301.
  23. Godlewski, Christophe J., 2015. "The dynamics of bank debt renegotiation in Europe: A survival analysis approach," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 19-31.
  24. Evans, Robert & Reiche, Sönje, 2015. "Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 1159-1187.
  25. Frank Gigler & Thomas Hemmer, 2008. "On the welfare effects of allowing unlimited renegotiation in agency relationships," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 37(2), pages 243-265, November.
  26. Mr. Luc E. Leruth & Elisabeth Paul, 2006. "A Principal-Agent Theory Approach to Public Expenditure Management Systems in Developing Countries," IMF Working Papers 2006/204, International Monetary Fund.
  27. Martimort, David, 1999. "Renegotiation Design with Multiple Regulators," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 261-293, October.
  28. Robert Evans & Sonje Reiche, 2013. "Mechanism Design and Non-Cooperative Renegotiation," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1331, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
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