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When Does Majority Rule Supply Public Goods Efficiently?

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Wallace E. Oates & Paul R. Portney & Wallace E. Oates & Paul R. Portney, 2004. "The Political Economy of Environmental Policy," Chapters, in: Environmental Policy and Fiscal Federalism, chapter 1, pages 3-30, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  2. Martin L. Weitzman, 2015. "A Voting Architecture for the Governance of Free-Driver Externalities, with Application to Geoengineering," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 117(4), pages 1049-1068, October.
  3. Wallace E. Oates & Wallace E. Oates, 2004. "Fiscal and Regulatory Competition: Theory and Evidence," Chapters, in: Environmental Policy and Fiscal Federalism, chapter 11, pages 195-208, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  4. Parry, Ian W. H., 2003. "How large are the welfare costs of tax competition?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 39-60, July.
  5. Régis Renault & Alain Trannoy, 2005. "Protecting Minorities through the Average Voting Rule," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 7(2), pages 169-199, May.
  6. Corneo, Giacomo, 2006. "Media capture in a democracy: The role of wealth concentration," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 37-58, January.
  7. Ted Bergstrom & Judy Roberts & Dan Rubinfeld & Perry Shapiro, 1988. "A Test for Efficiency in the Supply of Local Public Education," Papers _036, University of Michigan, Department of Economics.
  8. Glomm, Gerhard & Lagunoff, Roger, 1998. "A Tiebout theory of public vs private provision of collective goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 91-112, April.
  9. Theodore C. Bergstrom & Judith Roberts & Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Perry Shapiro, 1986. "The Efficiency of the Supply of Public Education," NBER Working Papers 1901, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2005. "Portfolio Diversification and Internalization of Production Externalities through Majority Voting," Working Papers hal-00587205, HAL.
  11. Timothy Goodspeed, 1994. "Efficiency and equity consequences of decentralized government: An application to Spain," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 1(1), pages 35-54, February.
  12. Robert Inman, 2005. "Financing Cities," NBER Working Papers 11203, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Dennis Epple & Richard Romano, 2003. "Collective Choice and Voluntary Provision of Public Goods," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 44(2), pages 545-572, May.
  14. Wallace E. Oates & Wallace E. Oates, 2004. "Fiscal Competition and European Union: Contrasting Perspectives," Chapters, in: Environmental Policy and Fiscal Federalism, chapter 10, pages 182-194, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  15. Oates, Wallace E., 2005. "Property taxation and local public spending: the renter effect," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 419-431, May.
  16. Lawrence Lindsey, 1988. "Federal Deductibility of State and Local Taxes: A Test of Public Choice by Representative Government," NBER Chapters, in: Fiscal Federalism: Quantitative Studies, pages 137-176, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Levon Barseghyan & Stephen Coate, 2017. "On the Dynamics of Community Development," NBER Working Papers 23674, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/10281 is not listed on IDEAS
  19. Stephen M. Calabrese & Dennis N. Epple & Richard E. Romano, 2012. "Inefficiencies from Metropolitan Political and Fiscal Decentralization: Failures of Tiebout Competition," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 79(3), pages 1081-1111.
  20. Winer, Stanley L. & Hettich, Walter, 1998. "What Is Missed if We Leave Out Collective Choice in the Analysis of Taxation," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 51(2), pages 373-389, June.
  21. Goodspeed, Timothy J., 1995. "Local income taxation: An externality, Pigouvian solution, and public policies," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 279-296, June.
  22. Barseghyan, Levon & Coate, Stephen, 2014. "Bureaucrats, voters, and public investment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 35-48.
  23. Cristina Ciocirlan & Bruce Yandle, 2003. "The Political Economy of Green Taxation in OECD Countries," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 203-218, May.
  24. Jeffrey Weiss, 1988. "Is vote-selling desirable?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 177-194, November.
  25. Feld, Lars P. & Kirchgassner, Gebhard, 2000. "Direct democracy, political culture, and the outcome of economic policy: a report on the Swiss experience," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 287-306, June.
  26. Renault, R. & Trannoy, A., 1999. "Protecting Minorities through Voting Rules," Papers 99-04, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
  27. Winer, Stanley L. & Hettich, Walter, 1998. "What Is Missed If We Leave Out Collective Choice in the Analysis of Taxation," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 51(n. 2), pages 373-89, June.
  28. Goodspeed, Timothy J., 1998. "On the importance of public choice in migration models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 373-379, June.
  29. Yu‐Bong Lai, 2018. "The Feasibility of the Double‐Dividend Hypothesis in a Democratic Economy," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 120(1), pages 211-241, January.
  30. Sita Nataraj Slavov, 2014. "Public Versus Private Provision of Public Goods," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 16(2), pages 222-258, April.
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