IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/bla/randje/v44y2013i4p712-732.html
   My bibliography  Save this item

Unobserved heterogeneity and reserve prices in auctions

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Lamy, Laurent & Patnam, Manasa & Visser, Michael, 2023. "Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 235(2), pages 1172-1202.
  2. Yao Luo & Peijun Sang & Ruli Xiao, 2024. "Order Statistics Approaches to Unobserved Heterogeneity in Auctions," Working Papers tecipa-776, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  3. Philip A Haile & Yuichi Kitamura, 2019. "Unobserved heterogeneity in auctions," The Econometrics Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 22(1), pages 1-19.
  4. Zhe Chen, 2021. "The multidimensional procurement auctions with reference‐based utility," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(2), pages 319-325, March.
  5. Stefan Seifert & Silke Hüttel, 2023. "Is there a risk of a winner’s curse in farmland auctions?," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, vol. 50(3), pages 1140-1177.
  6. Giovanni Compiani & Philip Haile & Marcelo Sant’Anna, 2020. "Common Values, Unobserved Heterogeneity, and Endogenous Entry in US Offshore Oil Lease Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(10), pages 3872-3912.
  7. Thomas R. Covert & Richard L. Sweeney, 2023. "Relinquishing Riches: Auctions versus Informal Negotiations in Texas Oil and Gas Leasing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 113(3), pages 628-663, March.
  8. Cristián Hernández & Daniel Quint & Christopher Turansick, 2020. "Estimation in English auctions with unobserved heterogeneity," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(3), pages 868-904, September.
  9. Ma, Jun & Marmer, Vadim & Shneyerov, Artyom, 2019. "Inference for first-price auctions with Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong’s estimator," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 211(2), pages 507-538.
  10. Syngjoo Choi & Lars Nesheim & Imran Rasul, 2010. "Reserve price effects in auctions: estimates from multiple RD designs," CeMMAP working papers CWP30/10, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  11. Joachim Freyberger & Bradley J. Larsen, 2022. "Identification in ascending auctions, with an application to digital rights management," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), pages 505-543, May.
  12. Seifert, Stefan & Hüttel, Silke, 2020. "Common values and unobserved heterogeneity in farmland auctions in Germany," FORLand Working Papers 21 (2020), Humboldt University Berlin, DFG Research Unit 2569 FORLand "Agricultural Land Markets – Efficiency and Regulation".
  13. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/5kht5rc22p99sq5tol4efe4ssb is not listed on IDEAS
  14. Laurent Lamy & Manasa Patnam & Michael Visser, 2023. "Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts," Post-Print hal-04382099, HAL.
  15. Marleen Marra, 2024. "Estimating and Auction Platform Game with Two-Sided Entry," Working Papers hal-03393068, HAL.
  16. Bradley J Larsen, 2021. "The Efficiency of Real-World Bargaining: Evidence from Wholesale Used-Auto Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(2), pages 851-882.
  17. Michele Fioretti, 2022. "Caring or Pretending to Care? Social Impact, Firms' Objectives, and Welfare (former title: Social Responsibility and Firm's Objectives)," SciencePo Working papers hal-03393065, HAL.
  18. Pasha Andreyanov & El Hadi Caoui, 2022. "Secret reserve prices by uninformed sellers," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(3), pages 1203-1256, July.
  19. Sant'Anna, Marcelo Castello Branco, 2017. "Empirical analysis of scoring auctions for oil and gas leases," FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 789, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil).
  20. Joris Pinkse & Karl Schurter, 2019. "Estimation of Auction Models with Shape Restrictions," Papers 1912.07466, arXiv.org.
  21. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/5kht5rc22p99sq5tol4efe4ssb is not listed on IDEAS
  22. Matthew Backus & Gregory Lewis, 2016. "Dynamic Demand Estimation in Auction Markets," NBER Working Papers 22375, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  23. Marcoux, Mathieu, 2022. "Strategic interactions in mobile network investment with a new entrant and unobserved heterogeneity," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
  24. Rodrigo Carril & Andres Gonzalez-Lira & Michael S. Walker, 2022. "Competition under incomplete contracts and the design of procurement policies," Economics Working Papers 1824, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  25. Andrew Chesher & Adam Rosen, 2017. "Incomplete English auction models with heterogeneity," CeMMAP working papers CWP27/17, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  26. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/5kht5rc22p99sq5tol4efe4ssb is not listed on IDEAS
  27. Luo, Yao, 2020. "Unobserved heterogeneity in auctions under restricted stochastic dominance," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 216(2), pages 354-374.
  28. Ian Fillmore, 2021. "Price Discrimination and Public Policy in the U.S. College Market," Working Papers 2021-028, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
  29. Bryan K. Bollinger & Wesley R. Hartmann, 2020. "Information vs. Automation and Implications for Dynamic Pricing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(1), pages 290-314, January.
  30. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/5kht5rc22p99sq5tol4efe4ssb is not listed on IDEAS
  31. Syngjoo Choi & Lars Nesheim & Imran Rasul, 2016. "Reserve Price Effects In Auctions: Estimates From Multiple Regression-Discontinuity Designs," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(1), pages 294-314, January.
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.