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Bribery versus extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Jacopo Bizzotto & Alessandro De Chiara, 2022. "Frequent audits and honest audits," Working Papers 202202, Oslo Metropolitan University, Oslo Business School.
  2. Mawani, Amin & Trivedi, Viswanath Umashanker, 2021. "Collusive vs. coercively corrupt tax auditors and their impact on tax compliance," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(C).
  3. Di Liddo, Giuseppe & Vinella, Annalisa, 2024. "Global public good provision in emergency states: A model of (asymmetric) yardstick competition between rent-seeking governments," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
  4. Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée & Troy J. Scott, 2015. "Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(4), pages 872-890, October.
  5. Angelucci, Charles & Russo, Antonio, 2012. "Moral Hazard in Hierarchies and Soft Information," TSE Working Papers 12-343, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  6. Rashedul Hasan & Muhammad Ashfaq, 2021. "Corruption and its diverse effect on credit risk: global evidence," Future Business Journal, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 1-13, December.
  7. Charles Angelucci & Antonio Russo, 2022. "Petty Corruption And Citizen Reports," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(2), pages 831-848, May.
  8. Alessandro De Chiara & Marco A. Schwarz, 2020. "A Dynamic Theory of Regulatory Capture," Working Papers 2020-12, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
  9. Mehmet Baç, 2023. "Quid pro quo harassment, contracts and liability," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 56(1), pages 24-45, February.
  10. Felli, Leonardo & Hortala-Vallve, Rafael, 2016. "Collusion, Blackmail and Whistle-Blowing," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 11(3), pages 279-312, October.
  11. Anh‐Tuan Doan & Bich‐Thanh Truong & Chi‐Cuong Nguyen & Phan‐Tam‐Nhu Nguyen & Hai‐Yen Truong & Anh‐Tuan Le, 2023. "Corruption and corporate leverage in an emerging economy: The role of economic freedom," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 94(2), pages 599-629, June.
  12. Benjamin Florian Siggelkow & Jan Trockel & Oliver Dieterle, 2018. "An inspection game of internal audit and the influence of whistle-blowing," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 88(7), pages 883-914, September.
  13. Che, Xiaogang & Huang, Yangguang & Zhang, Le, 2021. "Supervisory efficiency and collusion in a multiple-agent hierarchy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 425-442.
  14. Andrew Samuel & Ajit Mishra, 2022. "Does it matter who extorts? Extortion by competent and incompetent enforcers," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 69(3), pages 328-344, July.
  15. Bac, Mehmet, 2018. "Wages, performance and harassment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 232-248.
  16. Alessandro De Chiara & Luca Livio, 2012. "Truthful Reporting, Moral Hazard and Purely Soft Information," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2012-029, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  17. Charles Angelucci & Antonio Russo, 2015. "Petty corruption and citizen feedback," Working Papers 2015/25, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
  18. Andrew Samuel & Amy Farmer & Fabio Mendez, 2020. "Optimal regulation under imperfect enforcement: Permits, tickets, or both?," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 67(4), pages 420-441, September.
  19. Ajit Mishra & Andrew Samuel, 2013. "Preemptive Bribery with Incomplete Information," Department of Economics Working Papers 13/13, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
  20. Shin, Dongsoo & Yun, Sungho, 2021. "Supervisory information and loss aversion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
  21. Mookherjee, Dilip & Tsumagari, Masatoshi, 2023. "Regulatory mechanism design with extortionary collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
  22. Gao, Ruoxin & Yao, Shiqing & Yang, Ruina, 2024. "Responsible audit and consumer awareness under collusion risk," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 314(2), pages 466-476.
  23. De Chiara, Alessandro & Manna, Ester, 2022. "Corruption, regulation, and investment incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
  24. Kim, Sahrok & Praveen Parboteeah, K. & Cullen, John B. & Jeong, Nara, 2022. "Social institutions approach to women’s firm ownership and firm bribery activity: A study of small-sized firms in emerging markets," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 1333-1349.
  25. Sungho Yun, 2021. "Regulating corruptible certifier behavior," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 109-135, April.
  26. An, Weihua & Kweon, Yesola, 2017. "Do higher government wages induce less corruption? Cross-country panel evidence," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 39(5), pages 809-826.
  27. Erica L. Plambeck & Terry A. Taylor, 2016. "Supplier Evasion of a Buyer’s Audit: Implications for Motivating Supplier Social and Environmental Responsibility," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 18(2), pages 184-197, May.
  28. Seung Han Yoo, 2014. "Competition, Corruption and Institutional Design," Discussion Paper Series 1406, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
  29. Charles Angelucci & Antonio Russo, 2015. "Petty Corruption and Citizen Reports," CESifo Working Paper Series 5528, CESifo.
  30. Yun Sungho, 2012. "Costs of Engaging in Corruption: Equilibrium with Extortion and Framing," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-32, December.
  31. Alexander Henke & Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2022. "Honest agents in a corrupt equilibrium," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(3), pages 762-783, August.
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