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Lucky CEOs and Lucky Directors

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Lucas W. Davis and Catherine Hausman, 2020. "Are Energy Executives Rewarded for Luck?," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 6), pages 157-180.
  2. Curtis E. Clements & Ryan K. Jessup & John D. Neill & Paul Wertheim, 2018. "The relationship between director tenure and director quality," International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 15(3), pages 142-161, August.
  3. Kiyoung Chang & Ying Li & Ha‐Chin Yi, 2021. "Informed equity ownership and bank loan contracting," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(7-8), pages 1368-1403, July.
  4. Steven Hegemann & Iuliana Ismailescu, 2017. "The Effect of FASB Statement No. 123R on Stock Repurchases: An Empirical Examination of Management Incentives," Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies (RPBFMP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 20(02), pages 1-31, June.
  5. Ali, Usman & Hirshleifer, David, 2017. "Opportunism as a firm and managerial trait: Predicting insider trading profits and misconduct," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 126(3), pages 490-515.
  6. Paula Faria & Franscisco Vitorino Martins & Elísio Brandão, 2013. "Executive Compensation: Pay-for-Performance in High-Technology Firms," FEP Working Papers 517, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
  7. Chintrakarn, Pandej & Jiraporn, Pornsit & Kim, J.C., 2013. "The effect of corporate governance on CEO luck: Evidence from the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 169-174.
  8. Carola Frydman & Dirk Jenter, 2010. "CEO Compensation," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 2(1), pages 75-102, December.
  9. Stefan Winter & Philip Michels, 2019. "The managerial power approach: Is it testable?," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 23(3), pages 637-668, September.
  10. Marquardt, Blair B. & Myers, Brett W. & Niu, Xu, 2018. "Strategic voting and insider ownership," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 50-71.
  11. Aggarwal, Reena & Dahiya, Sandeep & Prabhala, Nagpurnanand R., 2019. "The power of shareholder votes: Evidence from uncontested director elections," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 134-153.
  12. Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez & Stefanie Stantcheva, 2014. "Optimal Taxation of Top Labor Incomes: A Tale of Three Elasticities," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 230-271, February.
  13. Lee Biggerstaff & David C. Cicero & Andy Puckett, 2013. "Unethical Culture, Suspect CEOs and Corporate Misbehavior," NBER Working Papers 19261, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Anwar Boumosleh & Brandon Cline, 2015. "Outside Director Stock Options and Dividend Policy," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 47(3), pages 381-410, June.
  15. Guthrie, Graeme & Stannard, Tom, 2020. "Easy money? Managerial power and the option backdating game revisited," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 118(C).
  16. Philippe Jacquart & J. Scott Armstrong, 2013. "The Ombudsman: Are Top Executives Paid Enough? An Evidence-Based Review," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 43(6), pages 580-589, December.
  17. Song, Wei-Ling & Wan, Kam-Ming, 2017. "Explicit employment contracts and CEO compensation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 540-560.
  18. Carver, Brian T. & Cline, Brandon N. & Hoag, Matthew L., 2013. "Underperformance of founder-led firms: An examination of compensation contracting theories during the executive stock options backdating scandal," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 294-310.
  19. Pietro Bonetti & Miguel Duro & Gaizka Ormazabal, 2020. "Disclosure Regulation and Corporate Acquisitions," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 55-103, March.
  20. Dittmann, Ingolf & Maug, Ernst & Zhang, Dan, 2011. "Restricting CEO pay," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 1200-1220, September.
  21. Sven-Olof Yrjö Collin & Yuliya Ponomareva & Sara Ottosson & Nina Sundberg, 2017. "Governance strategy and costs: board compensation in Sweden," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 21(3), pages 685-713, September.
  22. Tanseli Savaser & Elif Şişli-Ciamarra, 2017. "Managerial Performance Incentives and Firm Risk during Economic Expansions and Recessions," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(2), pages 911-944.
  23. Sedki Zaiane & Maria Semenova, 2025. "The Uniform Relationship Between Managerial Ability And Bank Loan Quality: Does It Hold? Evidence From Quantile Regressions," HSE Working papers WP BRP 96/FE/2025, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
  24. Andrea Nannicini & Duarte Pitta Ferraz & Ilídio Tomás Lopes, 2018. "Relationship between top executive compensation and corporate governance: evidence from large Italian listed companies," International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 15(4), pages 197-209, November.
  25. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Michael S. Weisbach, 2012. "The State of Corporate Governance Research," Springer Books, in: Sabri Boubaker & Bang Dang Nguyen & Duc Khuong Nguyen (ed.), Corporate Governance, edition 127, pages 325-346, Springer.
  26. Jean Canil & Bruce Rosser, 2012. "Australian evidence on CEO option grants," Multinational Finance Journal, Multinational Finance Journal, vol. 16(3-4), pages 225-260, September.
  27. Andrea Melis & Silvia Carta & Silvia Gaia, 2012. "Executive remuneration in blockholder-dominated firms. How do Italian firms use stock options?," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 16(3), pages 511-541, August.
  28. Song, Wei-Ling & Wan, Kam-Ming, 2019. "Does CEO compensation reflect managerial ability or managerial power? Evidence from the compensation of powerful CEOs," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 1-14.
  29. Fang, Lily & Huang, Sterling, 2024. "The governance of director compensation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 155(C).
  30. Alhaj-Ismail, Alaa & Adwan, Sami & Stittle, John, 2019. "Share-option based compensation expense, shareholder returns and financial crisis," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 20-35.
  31. Amore, Mario Daniele & Schwenen, Sebastian, 2020. "The Value of Luck in the Labor Market for CEOs," CEPR Discussion Papers 14839, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  32. Chyz, James A., 2013. "Personally tax aggressive executives and corporate tax sheltering," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 311-328.
  33. Athanasakou, Vasiliki & Ferreira, Daniel & Goh, Lisa, 2022. "Changes in CEO stock option grants: a look at the numbers," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 115609, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  34. Dilger, Alexander, 2012. "How (not) to pay non-executive directors," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics 9/2012, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics.
  35. Gabriel Natividad, 2013. "Financial Slack, Strategy, and Competition in Movie Distribution," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 24(3), pages 846-864, June.
  36. Mahroo Irani & Mahroo Irani & Mehdi Safari Gerayeli, 2017. "Relationship between Corporate Governance and CEO Compensation among Listed Firms in Tehran Stock Exchange," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 7(1), pages 285-292.
  37. Kim, Taeyeon & Kim, Hyun-Dong & Park, Kwangwoo, 2023. "Agency costs of customer concentration," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 533-558.
  38. Chen, Jie & Song, Wei & Goergen, Marc, 2019. "Passing the dividend baton: The impact of dividend policy on new CEOs' initial compensation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 458-481.
  39. Biggerstaff, Lee & Cicero, David C. & Puckett, Andy, 2015. "Suspect CEOs, unethical culture, and corporate misbehavior," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 98-121.
  40. Philippe Grégoire & Robert Glenn Hubbard & Michael F. Koehn & Marc Van Audenrode & Jimmy Royer, 2013. "Is backdating executive stock options always costly to shareholders?," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 53(3), pages 667-689, September.
  41. Michael Haylock, 2022. "Distributional differences in the time horizon of executive compensation," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 62(1), pages 157-186, January.
  42. Irmela F. Koch‐Bayram & Georg Wernicke, 2018. "Drilled to obey? Ex‐military CEOs and financial misconduct," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(11), pages 2943-2964, November.
  43. Harford, Jarrad & Kecskés, Ambrus & Mansi, Sattar, 2018. "Do long-term investors improve corporate decision making?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 424-452.
  44. Liu, Xiaoding, 2016. "Corruption culture and corporate misconduct," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 307-327.
  45. Devos, Erik & Elliott, William B. & Warr, Richard S., 2015. "CEO opportunism?: Option grants and stock trades around stock splits," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 18-35.
  46. Denton Collins & Gary Fleischman & Stacey Kaden & Juan Manuel Sanchez, 2018. "How Powerful CFOs Camouflage and Exploit Equity-Based Incentive Compensation," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 153(2), pages 591-613, December.
  47. Loyola, Gino & Portilla, Yolanda, 2014. "Reward for failure and executive compensation in institutional investors," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 349-361.
  48. Allan Hodgson & Michael Seamer & Katherine Uylangco, 2020. "Does stronger corporate governance constrain insider trading? Asymmetric evidence from Australia," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 60(3), pages 2665-2687, September.
  49. Hoi, Chun Keung(Stan) & Wu, Qiang & Zhang, Hao, 2019. "Does social capital mitigate agency problems? Evidence from Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(2), pages 498-519.
  50. Frédéric Teulon & Guillaume Bigot & Bernard Terrany & Negar Youssefian, 2016. "Rémunérations des PDG : toniques ou toxiques ? Une mise en perspective de la littérature," Post-Print hal-01865108, HAL.
  51. Viput Ongsakul & Anutchanat Jaroenjitrkam & Sirimon Treepongkaruna & Pornsit Jiraporn, 2022. "Does board gender diversity reduce ‘CEO luck’?," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 62(1), pages 243-260, March.
  52. Xin Qu & Majella Percy & Jenny Stewart & Fang Hu, 2018. "Executive stock option vesting conditions, corporate governance and CEO attributes: evidence from Australia," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 58(2), pages 503-533, June.
  53. Chintrakarn, Pandej & Jiraporn, Pornsit & Jiraporn, Napatsorn, 2014. "The effect of CEO luck on the informativeness of stock prices: Do lucky CEOs improve stock price informativeness?," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 289-294.
  54. Anne M. Wilkins & Dana R. Hermanson & Jeffrey R. Cohen, 2016. "Do Compensation Committee Members Perceive Changing CEO Incentive Performance Targets Mid-Cycle to be Fair?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 137(3), pages 623-638, September.
  55. Bianchi, Giuliano, 2016. "Stock options: From backdating to spring loading," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 215-221.
  56. Xu, Tianli & Xu, Longbing & Zhu, Siyuan, 2023. "Common ownership and executive pay-for-performance sensitivity: Evidence from China," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
  57. Bebchuk, Lucian A. & Cremers, K.J. Martijn & Peyer, Urs C., 2011. "The CEO pay slice," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 199-221, October.
  58. Hilscher, Jens & Landskroner, Yoram & Raviv, Alon, 2021. "Optimal regulation, executive compensation and risk taking by financial institutions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
  59. Cheng, Lin & Jin, Qinglu & Ma, Hui, 2023. "Tone emphasis and insider trading," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
  60. Ertimur, Yonca & Ferri, Fabrizio & Maber, David A., 2012. "Reputation penalties for poor monitoring of executive pay: Evidence from option backdating," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 118-144.
  61. Athanasakou, Vasiliki & Ferreira, Daniel & Goh, Lisa, 2022. "Changes in CEO stock option grants: A look at the numbers," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
  62. Marquardt, Blair B. & Sanchez, Juan Manuel, 2022. "Blockholder board representation and debt contracting," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
  63. Yisong S. Tian, 2017. "Managerial gaming of stock and option grants," Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 26(3), pages 127-152, August.
  64. Ansari, Iram Fatima & Goergen, Marc & Mira, Svetlana, 2014. "The determinants of the CEO successor choice in family firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 6-25.
  65. Bang Dang Nguyen & Kasper Meisner Nielsen, 2014. "What Death Can Tell: Are Executives Paid for Their Contributions to Firm Value?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(12), pages 2994-3010, December.
  66. Kelvin K. F. Law & Lillian F. Mills, 2017. "Military experience and corporate tax avoidance," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 141-184, March.
  67. Dyck, Alexander & Morse, Adair & Zingales, Luigi, 2023. "How pervasive is corporate fraud?," Working Papers 327, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
  68. Mia Hang Pham & Harvey Nguyen & Martin Young & Anh Dao, 2024. "Who Keeps Company with the Wolf will Learn to Howl: Does Local Corruption Culture Affect Financial Adviser Misconduct?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 194(1), pages 185-210, September.
  69. Liu, Cai & Yin, Chao, 2023. "Institutional investors’ monitoring attention, CEO compensation, and relative performance evaluation," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 56(C).
  70. Kanapathippillai, Sutharson & Johl, Shireenjit K. & Wines, Graeme, 2016. "Remuneration committee effectiveness and narrative remuneration disclosure," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 384-402.
  71. Guo, Lian & Peng, Diefeng & Rao, Yulei & Zhuang, Zili, 2023. "Visiting monks: Are nonlocal CEOs paid more?☆," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
  72. Yaowen Shan & Terry Walter, 2016. "Towards a Set of Design Principles for Executive Compensation Contracts," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 52(4), pages 619-684, December.
  73. Shinu Vig, 2024. "Environmental disclosures by Indian companies: role of board characteristics and board effectiveness," International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 21(1), pages 16-31, March.
  74. Cronqvist, Henrik & Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger, 2013. "CEO contract design: How do strong principals do it?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 659-674.
  75. Kee H. Chung & Choonsik Lee & Carl Hsin‐han Shen, 2020. "Passive blockholders, informational efficiency of prices, and firm value," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 38(3), pages 494-512, July.
  76. Anne Amar-Sabbah & Pierre Batteau, 2018. "CEO Compensation: Agency Theory is Irrelevant but not the Neoclassical Game-Theoretic Framework," Working Papers halshs-01818600, HAL.
  77. Quinn D. Curtis & Justin J. Hopkins, 2022. "Career concerns for revealing misreporting," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 1-34, March.
  78. Roberto Fernández-Gago & Laura Cabeza-García & Mariano Nieto, 2016. "Corporate social responsibility, board of directors, and firm performance: an analysis of their relationships," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 85-104, January.
  79. Kathy Fogel & Liping Ma & Randall Morck, 2021. "Powerful independent directors," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 50(4), pages 935-983, December.
  80. Anup Agrawal & Tareque Nasser, 2019. "Blockholders on Boards and CEO Compensation, Turnover and Firm Valuation," Quarterly Journal of Finance (QJF), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 9(03), pages 1-67, September.
  81. Loureiro, Gilberto & Makhija, Anil K. & Zhang, Dan, 2011. "Why Do Some CEOs Work for a One-Dollary Salary?," Working Paper Series 2011-7, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
  82. Petrov, Ivam & Chirkova, Evgeniya, 2012. "The Stock-Based Compensation Plans for Top Managemen," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 6, pages 1-17.
  83. Linxiao Liu & Harrison Liu & Jennifer Yin, 2014. "Stock Option Schedules and Managerial Opportunism," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(5-6), pages 652-684, June.
  84. Shu-Ling Lin & Lu Jun & Jing-Lun Yan, 2018. "Family Holding and Board Effectiveness on the Risk-taking of Financial Industry in China and Taiwan," Journal of Applied Finance & Banking, SCIENPRESS Ltd, vol. 8(2), pages 1-6.
  85. Ongsakul, Viput & Chatjuthamard, Pattanaporn & Jiraporn, Pornsit & Chaivisuttangkun, Sirithida, 2021. "Corporate integrity and hostile takeover threats: Evidence from machine learning and “CEO luck”," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(C).
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