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Rational Inattention to News: The Perils of Forward Guidance

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Tongkui Yu & Shu-Heng Chen, 2021. "Big Data, Scarce Attention and Decision-Making Quality," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 57(3), pages 827-856, March.
  2. Andrea Civelli & Cary Deck & Antonella Tutino, 2019. "Rationally Inattentive Savers and Monetary Policy Changes: A Laboratory Experiment," Working Papers 1915, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
  3. Kurt Graden Lunsford, 2018. "Understanding the Aspects of Federal Reserve Forward Guidance," Working Papers (Old Series) 1815, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  4. Paul Hubert & Fabien Labondance, 2016. "The Effect of ECB Forward Guidance on Policy Expectations," Working Papers hal-01394821, HAL.
  5. Ippei Fujiwara & Yuichiro Waki, 2015. "Private news and monetary policy forward guidance or (the expected virtue of ignorance)," Globalization Institute Working Papers 238, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
  6. Herbert Sylvérie, 2022. "State-dependent Central Bank Communication with Heterogeneous Beliefs," Working papers 875, Banque de France.
  7. Avoyan, Ala & Romagnoli, Giorgia, 2023. "Paying for inattention," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
  8. Telegin, O., 2022. "Bank of Russia regular communications and volatility short-term effects in financial markets," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 54(2), pages 130-155.
  9. Kenza Benhima & Isabella Blengini, 2020. "Optimal Monetary Policy when Information is Market-Generated," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 130(628), pages 956-975.
  10. Clain-Chamosset-Yvrard, Lise & Seegmuller, Thomas, 2015. "Rational bubbles and macroeconomic fluctuations: The (de-)stabilizing role of monetary policy," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 1-15.
  11. Philippe Andrade & Gaetano Gaballo & Eric Mengus & Benoît Mojon, 2019. "Forward Guidance and Heterogeneous Beliefs," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 1-29, July.
  12. Matějka, Filip & Mackowiak, Bartosz & Wiederholt, Mirko, 2018. "Survey: Rational Inattention, a Disciplined Behavioral Model," CEPR Discussion Papers 13243, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. Ricardo Reis, 2013. "Central Bank Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 27(4), pages 17-44, Fall.
  14. Kurt G. Lunsford, 2020. "Policy Language and Information Effects in the Early Days of Federal Reserve Forward Guidance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(9), pages 2899-2934, September.
  15. George-Marios Angeletos & Chen Lian, 2018. "Forward Guidance without Common Knowledge," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(9), pages 2477-2512, September.
  16. Paul Hubert & Fabien Labondance, 2018. "The Effect of ECB Forward Guidance on the Term Structure of Interest Rates," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 14(5), pages 193-222, December.
  17. Eric Gaus, 2014. "Adaptive Learning, Heterogeneous Expectations and Forward Guidance," Working Papers 14-03, Ursinus College, Department of Economics.
  18. Coenen, Günter & Ehrmann, Michael & Gaballo, Gaetano & Hoffmann, Peter & Nakov, Anton & Nardelli, Stefano & Persson, Eric & Strasser, Georg H., 2017. "Communication of monetary policy in unconventional times," CFS Working Paper Series 578, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
  19. Abad, Pilar & Robles, M.-Dolores & Alonso Orts, Carlos, 2023. "Stress testing programs and credit risk opacity of banks: USA vs Europe," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
  20. Chahrour, Ryan & Jurado, Kyle, 2021. "Optimal foresight," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 245-259.
  21. Hwang, In Do & Lustenberger, Thomas & Rossi, Enzo, 2021. "Does communication influence executives’ opinion of central bank policy?☆," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 115(C).
  22. Campbell, Jeffrey R., 2019. "Comment on “Can more public information raise uncertainty? The international evidence on forward guidance” by Michael Ehrmann, Gaetano Gaballo, Peter Hoffmann and Georg Strasser," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 113-117.
  23. Ehrmann, Michael & Gaballo, Gaetano & Hoffmann, Peter & Strasser, Georg, 2019. "Can more public information raise uncertainty? The international evidence on forward guidance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 93-112.
  24. Moustapha Daouda Dala & Isabelle Distinguin & Alain Sauviat, 2020. "What is the information value of bank's stress tests? An investigation using banks' bond split ratings," Working Papers hal-02475512, HAL.
  25. Ippei Fujiwara & Yuichiro Waki, 2022. "The Delphic forward guidance puzzle in New Keynesian models," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 46, pages 280-301, October.
  26. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/61ma1iq1299m89uud61kkjcjot is not listed on IDEAS
  27. Bartosz Maćkowiak & Filip Matějka & Mirko Wiederholt, 2023. "Rational Inattention: A Review," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 61(1), pages 226-273, March.
  28. Cali Curley & Galib Rustamov & Nicky Harrison & Madeline Venable, 2020. "Susceptibility to Inattention: Unpacking Who is Susceptible to Inattention in Energy‐Based Electronic Billing," Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 37(6), pages 744-764, November.
  29. Benoît Cœuré, 2017. "Central Bank Communication in a Low Interest Rate Environment," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 28(5), pages 813-822, November.
  30. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/2g6qj1trtu8q2r79ee4jp49krd is not listed on IDEAS
  31. Bezerra Bisneto, João Lídio, 2016. "Communication policy with public uncertainty," Textos para discussão 431, FGV EESP - Escola de Economia de São Paulo, Fundação Getulio Vargas (Brazil).
  32. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/61ma1iq1299m89uud61kkjcjot is not listed on IDEAS
  33. Anna Agliari & Domenico Massaro & Nicolò Pecora & Alessandro Spelta, 2017. "Inflation Targeting, Recursive Inattentiveness, and Heterogeneous Beliefs," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 49(7), pages 1587-1619, October.
  34. In Do Hwang & Enzo Rossi, 2020. "Does communication influence executives' opinion of central bank policy?," Working Papers 2020-17, Swiss National Bank.
  35. Krokida, Styliani-Iris & Makrychoriti, Panagiota & Spyrou, Spyros, 2020. "Monetary policy and herd behavior: International evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 386-417.
  36. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/2g6qj1trtu8q2r79ee4jp49krd is not listed on IDEAS
  37. Patrick Hirsch & Lars P. Feld & Ekkehard A. Köhler, 2023. "Breaking Monetary Policy News: The Role of Mass Media Coverage of ECB Announcements for Public Inflation Expectations," CESifo Working Paper Series 10285, CESifo.
  38. Laura Gáti, 2023. "Talking Over Time ‐ Dynamic Central Bank Communication," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(5), pages 1147-1176, August.
  39. Moustapha Daouda Dala & Isabelle Distinguin & Alain Sauviat, 2020. "What is the information value of bank's stress tests? An investigation using banks' bond split ratings," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 40(1), pages 485-499.
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