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Timing Decisions in Organizations: Communication and Authority in a Dynamic Environment

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Cited by:

  1. Arve, Malin & Zwart, Gijsbert, 2023. "Optimal procurement and investment in new technologies under uncertainty," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 147(C).
  2. Emeric Henry & Marco Loseto & Marco Ottaviani, 2022. "Regulation with Experimentation: Ex Ante Approval, Ex Post Withdrawal, and Liability," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 5330-5347, July.
  3. Lambrecht, Bart & Chen, Shiqi, 2019. "Financial Policies and Internal Governance with Heterogeneous Risk Preferences," CEPR Discussion Papers 13888, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Yingni Guo, 2016. "Dynamic Delegation of Experimentation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(8), pages 1969-2008, August.
  5. Aleksei Smirnov & Egor Starkov, 2019. "Timing of predictions in dynamic cheap talk: experts vs. quacks," ECON - Working Papers 334, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
  6. Gabriele Gratton & Richard Holden & Anton Kolotilin, 2015. "Timing Information Flows," Discussion Papers 2015-16, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
  7. Arve, Malin & Honryo, Takakazu, 2022. "Wasteful procedures?," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
  8. Bolton, Patrick & Wang, Neng & Yang, Jinqiang, 2019. "Investment under uncertainty with financial constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
  9. Leitner, Yaron & Yilmaz, Bilge, 2019. "Regulating a model," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(2), pages 251-268.
  10. Emeric Henry & Marco Ottaviani, 2019. "Research and the Approval Process: The Organization of Persuasion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(3), pages 911-955, March.
  11. Kakhbod, Ali & Loginova, Uliana, 2023. "When does introducing verifiable communication choices improve welfare?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 210(C), pages 139-162.
  12. Yaron Leitner & Bilge Yilmaz, 2016. "Regulating A Model," Working Papers 16-31, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  13. Gabriele Gratton & Richard Holden & Anton Kolotilin, 2018. "When to Drop a Bombshell," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 85(4), pages 2139-2172.
  14. Emeric Henry & Gianmarco Ottaviano, 2019. "Research and the Approval Process: the Organization of Persuasion," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/1gr6n3t28b9, Sciences Po.
  15. Gao, Yongling & Driouchi, Tarik & Bennett, David J., 2018. "Ambiguity aversion in buyer-seller relationships: A contingent-claims and social network explanation," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 200(C), pages 50-67.
  16. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/1gr6n3t28b94tafji6op8tlqs1 is not listed on IDEAS
  17. Yaron Leitner & Basil Williams, 2023. "Model Secrecy and Stress Tests," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 78(2), pages 1055-1095, April.
  18. Migrow, Dimitri, 2018. "Designing Communication Hierarchies," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 44, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
  19. Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic & Jennifer Soto, 2019. "Financing PPP Projects with PVR Contracts: Theory and Evidence from the UK and Chile," Documentos de Trabajo 347, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  20. Seungjin Han & Alex Sam & Youngki Shin, 2023. "Optimal Delegation in Markets for Matching with Signaling," Papers 2303.09415, arXiv.org.
  21. Suzanne Bijkerk & Josse (J.) Delfgaauw & Vladimir (V.A.) Karamychev & Otto (O.H.) Swank, 2018. "Need to Know? On Information Systems in Firms," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 18-091/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
  22. Yaron Leitner & Basil Williams, 2018. "Model Secrecy and Stress Tests," 2018 Meeting Papers 566, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  23. Juan Escobar & Qiaoxi Zhang, 2019. "Delegating Learning," Documentos de Trabajo 348, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  24. Baldauf, Markus & Frei, Christoph & Mollner, Joshua, 2024. "Block trade contracting," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
  25. Sebastian Gryglewicz & Barney Hartman-Glaser & Geoffery Zheng, 2020. "Growth Options, Incentives, and Pay for Performance: Theory and Evidence," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(3), pages 1248-1277, March.
  26. Pablo Moran, 2017. "Information Revelation in Merger Waves," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 6(2), pages 174-233.
  27. Joel Watson, 2021. "Theoretical Foundations of Relational Incentive Contracts," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 13(1), pages 631-659, August.
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