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Financial Innovation, Communication and the Theory of the Firm

Author

Listed:
  • Marc Oliver Bettzuege
  • Thorsten Hens

Abstract

When markets are incomplete, the competitive equilibria considered so far are not constrained Pareto-efficient, production efficiency breaks down and shareholders no longer agree on the objective function of the firm. We first show by way of an example that these inefficiencies originate in the double role of firms in incomplete markets: providing high market value and providing good hedging opportunities (spanning role). To disentangle these two conflicting roles of the firm's decision, we then suggest to let the firm choose a relevant financial policy by issuing securities being collaterized by the production plan. In order to guarantee that the firm does not choose to innovate trivial assets, it is then shown to be crucial that the firm`s shareholders agree on the same set of beliefs. Therefore we introduce some communication network into the model which allows the shareholders to exchange their views on the firm's best policies. In our main result we demonstrate that competitive equilibria with communication of shareholders and a relevant financial policy of the firm are Pareto- efficient, provided there are at least as many firms as there are shareholders.

Suggested Citation

  • Marc Oliver Bettzuege & Thorsten Hens, "undated". "Financial Innovation, Communication and the Theory of the Firm," IEW - Working Papers 032, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    • Handle: RePEc:zur:iewwpx:032
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    File URL: https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/51934/8/Firminc_paris_rev.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/10282 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2001. "Proxy fights in incomplete markets: when majority voting and sidepayments are equivalent," Working Papers hal-00597200, HAL.
    3. Schenk-Hoppe, Klaus Reiner & Schmalfu[ss], Bjorn, 2001. "Random fixed points in a stochastic Solow growth model," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 19-30, September.
    4. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/10282 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    theory of the firm; incomplete markets; communication; financial innovation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm

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