Author
Listed:
- Peitz, Martin
- Schweitzer, Heike
Abstract
Suchmaschinen ermöglichen Nutzern einen schnellen Zugang zu Informationen, die sie konkret suchen oder die sie durch die Suchmaschine entdecken. Sie haben sich zu wichtigen Informationsintermediären entwickelt. Aufgrund ihrer zentralen Rolle in der Informationsvermittlung und der herausgehobenen Stellung von Google wird in der Öffentlichkeit die Frage nach einer Regulierung gestellt. Die "Informationsherrschaft" hat dabei verschiedene Seiten: Zum einen kann die unbegrenzte Auffindbarkeit personenbezogener Information mit den Interessen der Betroffenen kollidieren. Das "Interesse an der Unauffindbarkeit" ist Teil des allgemeinen Persönlichkeitsrechts und mittlerweile als ein "Recht auf Vergessen" anerkannt - das allerdings in Spannung zum ebenfalls grundrechtlich geschützten Informationsinteresse der Öffentlichkeit steht. Suchmaschinen müssen diese Interessen gegeneinander abwägen. Mit der "Regulierung" gegenläufiger informationeller Interessen obliegt ihnen eine schwierige Aufgabe. Zum anderen gibt es - nicht zuletzt im kommerziellen Bereich - häufig ein Interesse an der Auffindbarkeit, das berührt ist, wenn Information im Widerspruch zu Relevanzkriterien unterdrückt bzw. benachteiligt wird. Unter dem Begriff "Suchneutralität" ist gefordert worden, Suchmaschinen auch hinsichtlich der Auffindbarkeit von Information eine öffentliche Regulierungsfunktion zuzuweisen. In diesem Artikel sprechen wir uns gegen eine solche ex-ante-Regulierung aus. Das Wettbewerbsrecht reicht aus, um vor marktbezogenen Formen des Missbrauchs von "Informationsmacht" zu schützen. Mit Blick auf die vielfältigen offenen Fragen in der Anwendung des Wettbewerbsrechts zeigen wir einen neuen Ansatz auf. @Search engines allow users quick access to information, which they are trying to find or discover through the search engine. Thus, search engines have become important information intermediaries. Due to their central role in information exchange and the prominent role played by Google, part of the public debate focuses on the question whether - and if so how - there is a need for regulatory intervention. Informational power by search engines should be analyzed from different perspectives. On the one hand, unlimited access to personal data can be in conflict with the interests of individuals whose data can be accessed. These interests are part of a right to privacy, including a "right to be forgotten," which, however, must be balanced against the public interest in disclosure of information."'Regulating" these conflicting interests is a difficult task - a task that lies with the search engines. On the other hand, firms and individuals may have an interest in their information to be found, in particular (but not only) for commercial purposes. Suppressing or "downgrading" this information as displayed to users may significantly reduce visibility. In light of these interests, it has been proposed to oblige search engines to implement "search neutrality"; i.e., that they have to present search results in an unbiased way. In this article, we take a clear position against ex-ante regulation. Instead, competition law provides a sufficient framework, to protect against the abuse of "informational" market power. We sketch a new approach that may allow competition law to be applied more quickly in dynamic markets such as internet search markets.
Suggested Citation
Peitz, Martin & Schweitzer, Heike, 2016.
"Suchmaschinen unter der Lupe: Informationsherrschaft und ihre Schranken,"
ZEW Discussion Papers
16-069, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
Handle:
RePEc:zbw:zewdip:16069
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JEL classification:
- K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
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