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Predation enforcement options: An evaluation using a Cournot framework

Author

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  • Hüschelrath, Kai
  • Weigand, Jürgen

Abstract

The paper characterises the building blocks of a framework to enforce antipredation rules and subsequently evaluates selected enforcement options in a Cournot-type duopoly predation model. Differentiating between a no rule approach, an ex ante approach and two ex post approaches, it is shown that an ex post approach typically maximises overall welfare. However, an ex ante approach can be the preferred option in cases where the entrant has a large cost advantage over the incumbent.

Suggested Citation

  • Hüschelrath, Kai & Weigand, Jürgen, 2010. "Predation enforcement options: An evaluation using a Cournot framework," ZEW Discussion Papers 10-082, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:10082
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    competition policy; monopolisation; predation; enforcement;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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