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Corporate governance versus economic governance: banks and industrial restructuring in the US and Germany

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  • Vitols, Sigurt

Abstract

This paper critically examines the debate on corporate governance and the claim (often made in Anglo-American companies) that the close links between German banks and industry are primarily responsible for the longer-term investment strategies and greater quality competitiveness of German manufacturing. Instead, it is argued here that manufacturing investment and bank behavior must be examined within a broader system of economic governance. In particular the regulation of labor markets is a key factor influencing company choices between price and quality-competitive strategies. The corporatist regulation of German labor markets has encouraged quality-competitive strategies by keeping labor costs out of competition to a greater extent than in the US, where a collapse in pattern bargaining in core manufacturing industries and the strategic use of bankruptcy was motivated by companies' attempts to gain a comparative price advantage on the basis of lower labor costs. This argument is supported through a case study of the restructuring of the steel industry in Germany and the US in the 1980s.

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  • Vitols, Sigurt, 1995. "Corporate governance versus economic governance: banks and industrial restructuring in the US and Germany," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economic Change and Employment FS I 95-310, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbece:fsi95310
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    Cited by:

    1. Ojo, Marianne, 2009. "The role of external auditors in corporate governance: agency problems and the management of risk," MPRA Paper 47346, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 02 Jun 2013.
    2. Khan, Dr. Muhammad Irfan & Mehar, Dr. Muhammad Ayub & Iqbal, Dr. Athar Iqbal, 2015. "Development Financing and Economic Governance: Analysis of the Liquidity Crisis and Circularity Debts in Pakistan," MPRA Paper 80745, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Dec 2016.
    3. Sigurt Vitols, 1997. "German Industrial Policy: An Overview," Industry and Innovation, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(1), pages 15-36.
    4. Steven Casper & Catherine Matraves, 1997. "Corporate Governance and Firm Strategy in the Pharmaceutical Industry," CIG Working Papers FS IV 97-20, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
    5. Casper, Steven, 1999. "High technology governance and institutional adaptiveness: do technology policies usefully promote commercial innovation within the German biotechnology industry?," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economic Change and Employment FS I 99-307, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.

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