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Loan Insurance, Adverse Selection and Screening

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  • Kuncl, Martin
  • Ahnert, Toni

Abstract

We examine insurance against loan default when lenders can screen in primary markets at a heterogeneous cost and learn loan quality over time. In equilibrium, low-cost lenders screen loans but some high-cost lenders insure them. Insured loans are risk-free and liquid in a secondary market, while uninsured loans are subject to adverse selection. Loan insurance reduces the amount of lemons traded in the secondary market for uninsured loans and improves liquidity and welfare. This pecuniary externality implies insufficient loan insurance in the liquid equilibrium. To achieve constrained efficiency, a regulator (i) guarantees a minimum price in the market for uninsured loans to eliminatea welfare-dominated illiquid equilibrium; and (ii) imposes Pigouvian subsidies on loan insurance in the liquid equilibrium to correct for the externality.

Suggested Citation

  • Kuncl, Martin & Ahnert, Toni, 2019. "Loan Insurance, Adverse Selection and Screening," VfS Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy 203565, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc19:203565
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jonathan Chiu & Thorsten V. Koeppl, 2016. "Trading Dynamics with Adverse Selection and Search: Market Freeze, Intervention and Recovery," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 83(3), pages 969-1000.
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    3. Parlour, Christine A. & Winton, Andrew, 2013. "Laying off credit risk: Loan sales versus credit default swaps," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(1), pages 25-45.
    4. Jean Tirole, 2012. "Overcoming Adverse Selection: How Public Intervention Can Restore Market Functioning," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(1), pages 29-59, February.
    5. Christine Parlour & Guillaume Plantin, 2008. "Loan Sales and Relationship Banking," Post-Print hal-03415832, HAL.
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    7. Jonathan Chiu & Thorsten V. Koeppl, 2016. "Trading Dynamics with Adverse Selection and Search: Market Freeze, Intervention and Recovery," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 83(3), pages 969-1000.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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