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Democracy and compliance in public goods games

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  • Gallier, Carlo

Abstract

I investigate if, how, and why the effect of a contribution rule in a public goods game depends on how it is implemented: endogenously chosen or externally imposed. The rule prescribes full contributions to the public good backed by a nondeterrent sanction for those who do not comply. My experimental design allows me to disentangle to what extent the effect of the contribution rule under democracy is driven by self-selection of treatments, information transmitted via the outcome of the referendum, and democracy per se. In case treatments are endogenously chosen via a democratic decision-making process, the contribution rule significantly increases contributions to the public good. However, democratic participation does not affect participants’ contribution behavior directly, after controlling for self-selection of treatments and the information transmitted by voting.

Suggested Citation

  • Gallier, Carlo, 2018. "Democracy and compliance in public goods games," VfS Annual Conference 2018 (Freiburg, Breisgau): Digital Economy 181620, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc18:181620
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Matthias Sutter & Hannelore Weck-Hannemann, 2004. "An Experimental Test of the Public Goods Crowing Out Hypothesis when Taxation Is Endogenous," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 60(1), pages 94-110, April.
    2. Jennifer Zelmer, 2003. "Linear Public Goods Experiments: A Meta-Analysis," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 6(3), pages 299-310, November.
    3. Jean‐Robert Tyran & Lars P. Feld, 2006. "Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non‐deterrent," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(1), pages 135-156, March.
    4. Vollan, Björn & Landmann, Andreas & Zhou, Yexin & Hu, Biliang & Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten, 2017. "Cooperation and authoritarian values: An experimental study in China," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 90-105.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sausgruber, Rupert & Sonntag, Axel & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2021. "Disincentives from redistribution: evidence on a dividend of democracy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 136(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Laboratory experiment; public good; democracy; endogenous institutions; voting; contribution rule; compliance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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