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Liquidity Regulation, the Central Bank, and the Money Market

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  • Scheubel, Beatrice
  • Körding, Julia

Abstract

As reliance on excessively short-term wholesale funding has been one of the major causes for the 2007-2009 financial crisis, recent advances in global liquidity regulation try to curb the excessive reliance on short-term wholesale funding without being clear on how such an approach will affect the overall equilibrium on money markets. In particular, liquidity regulation may interfere with the central bank's influence on short-term money market rates. This paper tries to fill the gap in understanding the interaction between the money market, the central bank, and the regulator. Importantly, it shows that the existence of a central bank can be welfare-improving when the market equilibrium is driven by collateral constraints and asymmetric information. Regulation can be welfare-improving in the presence of an externality and also in case of collateral constraints, but reduces activity on the unsecured market. This implies that in case of collateral constraints the regulator can lead to a complete crowding out of the unsecured market which leads to an increased central bank intermediation need.

Suggested Citation

  • Scheubel, Beatrice & Körding, Julia, 2013. "Liquidity Regulation, the Central Bank, and the Money Market," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79754, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79754
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    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/79754/1/VfS_2013_pid_515.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John C. Williams & John B. Taylor, 2009. "A Black Swan in the Money Market," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 58-83, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Krug, Sebastian, 2015. "The interaction between monetary and macroprudential policy: Should central banks "lean against the wind" to foster macrofinancial stability?," Economics Working Papers 2015-08, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • H12 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Crisis Management
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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