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Verhaltensanreize der Abwasserabgabe: Eine Untersuchung der Tarifstruktur der Abwasserabgabe

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  • Scholl, Rainer

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  • Scholl, Rainer, 1995. "Verhaltensanreize der Abwasserabgabe: Eine Untersuchung der Tarifstruktur der Abwasserabgabe," FiFo Discussion Papers - Finanzwissenschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 95-1, University of Cologne, FiFo Institute for Public Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:uoccpe:951
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Terrebonne, R. Peter, 1977. "Enforcement costs and the incentive to evade controls on production," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 129-134, June.
    2. Storey, D J & McCabe, P J, 1980. "The Criminal Waste Discharger," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 27(1), pages 30-40, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ewringmann, Dieter & Scholl, Rainer, 1996. "Zur fünften Novellierung der Abwasserabgabe: Meßlösung und sonst nichts?," FiFo Discussion Papers - Finanzwissenschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 96-2, University of Cologne, FiFo Institute for Public Economics.
    2. Peichl, Andreas & Fuest, Clemens & Schaefer, Thilo, 2005. "Dokumentation FiFoSiM: Integriertes Steuer-Transfer-Mikrosimulations- und CGE-Modell," FiFo Discussion Papers - Finanzwissenschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 05-3, University of Cologne, FiFo Institute for Public Economics.

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