On the comparative advantage of tradable emission permits in a setting of uncertain abatement costs and market power: A case against the invariably pessimistic view
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References listed on IDEAS
- Montero, Juan-Pablo, 2002. "Permits, Standards, and Technology Innovation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 23-44, July.
- van Egteren, Henry & Weber, Marian, 1996. "Marketable Permits, Market Power, and Cheating," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 161-173, March.
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More about this item
Keywords
external diseconomies of pollution; emission standards; tradable emission permits; emission taxes; uncertainty; Cournot competition; market power; strategic behaviour;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D89 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Other
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ENE-2013-04-13 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2013-04-13 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-REG-2013-04-13 (Regulation)
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