IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/ubwwpe/20185.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Entering a foreign market: Exports, FDI or strategic alliance?

Author

Listed:
  • Morasch, Karl

Abstract

The decision over exports vs. foreign direct investment (FDI) is usually discussed in an extension of the so-called Melitz model where firms with heterogeneous costs compete in a monopolistically competitive industry. The present paper starts from a situation where a potential foreign entrant would be just indifferent between exports and FDI in such a setting. However, by assuming oligopolistic interaction, strategic considerations are also taken into account. It is shown how the strategic impact of lower marginal cost makes FDI more attractive in a Cournot setting while exports are preferable under price competition in a market with differentiated goods. Beyond that it is also explored how a strategic alliance with a local incumbent could be a superior alternative for market entry.

Suggested Citation

  • Morasch, Karl, 2018. "Entering a foreign market: Exports, FDI or strategic alliance?," Working Papers in Economics 2018,5, Bundeswehr University Munich, Economic Research Group.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ubwwpe:20185
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/191599/1/1046978276.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michael Spence, 1976. "Product Selection, Fixed Costs, and Monopolistic Competition," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 43(2), pages 217-235.
    2. Morasch, Karl, 2000. "Strategic alliances as Stackelberg cartels - concept and equilibrium alliance structure," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 257-282, February.
    3. Elhanan Helpman & Marc J. Melitz & Stephen R. Yeaple, 2004. "Export Versus FDI with Heterogeneous Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 300-316, March.
    4. Dixit, Avinash K & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1977. "Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(3), pages 297-308, June.
    5. Michael L. Katz, 1991. "Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(3), pages 307-328, Autumn.
    6. Bekkers, Eddy & Francois, Joseph, 2013. "Trade and industrial structure with large firms and heterogeneity," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 69-90.
    7. Elhanan Helpman, 2006. "Trade, FDI, and the Organization of Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(3), pages 589-630, September.
    8. Marc J. Melitz, 2003. "The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1695-1725, November.
    9. Collie, David R., 2016. "Gains from variety? Product differentiation and the possibility of losses from trade under Cournot oligopoly with free entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 55-58.
    10. Maja Barac & Rafael Moner-Colonques, 2016. "Internationalization Strategies In Oligopoly With Heterogeneous Firms," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(S1), pages 66-77, December.
    11. Raymond Deneckere & Carl Davidson, 1985. "Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(4), pages 473-486, Winter.
    12. David M. Kreps & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1983. "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 326-337, Autumn.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Belleflamme,Paul & Peitz,Martin, 2015. "Industrial Organization," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107687899, September.
    2. repec:wsr:wpaper:y:2008:i:012 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Roman Stöllinger & Robert Stehrer & Johannes Pöschl, 2012. "Austrian exporters: unique or alike? New insights and missing puzzle pieces," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 39(3), pages 375-405, August.
    4. Gouel, Christophe & Jean, Sébastien, 2023. "Love of variety and gains from trade," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 158(C).
    5. Simon P. Anderson, Nisvan Erkal and, 2009. "Aggregative Oligopoly Games with Entry," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1175, The University of Melbourne, revised 2013.
    6. Lutz Arnold & Stefanie Trepl, 2015. "A North-South Trade Model of Offshoring and Unemployment," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 26(5), pages 999-1039, November.
    7. Gopinath, Munisamy & Sheldon, Ian M. & Echeverria, Rodrigo, 2007. "Firm Heterogeneity and International Trade: Implications for Agricultural and Food Industries," Trade Issues Papers 9349, International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium.
    8. Melitz, Marc J. & Redding, Stephen J., 2014. "Heterogeneous Firms and Trade," Handbook of International Economics, in: Gopinath, G. & Helpman, . & Rogoff, K. (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 0, pages 1-54, Elsevier.
    9. Ignat Stepanok, 2015. "Cross-border Mergers and Greenfield Foreign Direct Investment," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(1), pages 111-136, February.
    10. Antrà s, Pol & Yeaple, Stephen R., 2014. "Multinational Firms and the Structure of International Trade," Handbook of International Economics, in: Gopinath, G. & Helpman, . & Rogoff, K. (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 0, pages 55-130, Elsevier.
    11. Pflüger, Michael P. & Russek, Stephan, 2010. "Trade and Industrial Policies with Heterogeneous Firms: The Role of Country Asymmetries," IZA Discussion Papers 5387, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    12. Robert Kelm, 2016. "Eksport, import i kurs złotego: 2000−2014," Bank i Kredyt, Narodowy Bank Polski, vol. 47(6), pages 585-620.
    13. Michael Pflüger & Stephan Russek, 2014. "Trade and Industrial Policies with Heterogeneous Firms: The Role of Country Asymmetries," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(1), pages 170-188, February.
    14. Abeliansky, Ana Lucia & Martínez-Zarzoso, Inmaculada & Prettner, Klaus, 2020. "3D printing, international trade, and FDI," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 288-306.
    15. Michael Pflüger & Stephan Russek, 2011. "Trade and Industrial Policies with Heterogeneous Firms: The Role of Country Asymmetries," Working Papers 094, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE).
    16. Dinopoulos, Elias & Unel, Bulent, 2013. "A simple model of quality heterogeneity and international trade," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 68-83.
    17. Wilhelm Kohler & Marcel Smolka, 2009. "Global Sourcing Decisions and Firm Productivity: Evidence from Spain," CESifo Working Paper Series 2903, CESifo.
    18. Abeliansky, Ana L. & Martínez-Zarzoso, Imnaculada & Prettner, Klaus, 2015. "The impact of 3D printing on trade and FDI," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 262, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    19. Erhardt, Katharina, 2017. "On home market effects and firm heterogeneity," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 316-340.
    20. J. Peter Neary, 2002. "Globalisation and market structure," Working Papers 200220, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
    21. Elhanan Helpman, 2010. "Labor Market Frictions as a Source of Comparative Advantage, with Implications for Unemployment and Inequality," NBER Working Papers 15764, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Entry strategies; Trade; FDI; Alliances; Oligopoly;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:ubwwpe:20185. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ivbwmde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.