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Private information, risk aversion, and the evolution of market research

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  • Güth, Sandra
  • Güth, Werner
  • Müller, Wieland

Abstract

On a homogeneous oligopoly market informed sellers are fully aware of market demand whereas uninformed sellers only know the distribution. We first derive the market results when sellers are risk averse, similarly to Ponssard (1979) who assumed risk neutrality throughout. With the help of these results evolutionary processes are formulated according to which sellers can switch to market research or refrain from it depending on the difference in profits of informed and uninformed sellers. We derive the evolutionarily stable number of informed sellers and discuss how it is influenced by market parameters.

Suggested Citation

  • Güth, Sandra & Güth, Werner & Müller, Wieland, 2000. "Private information, risk aversion, and the evolution of market research," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 2000,113, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:sfb373:2000113
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Li, Lode & McKelvey, Richard D. & Page, Talbot, 1987. "Optimal research for cournot oligopolists," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 140-166, June.
    2. Jean-Pierre Ponssard, 1979. "The Strategic Role of Information on the Demand Function in an Oligopolistic Market," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 25(3), pages 243-250, March.
    3. Hwang, Hae-shin, 1995. "Information Acquisition and Relative Efficiency of Competitive, Oligopoly and Monopoly Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(2), pages 325-340, May.
    4. Daughety, Andrew F & Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1994. "Asymmetric Information Acquisition and Behavior in Role Choice Models: An Endogenously Generated Signaling Game," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(4), pages 795-819, November.
    5. Jean-Pierre Ponssard, 1979. "Uncertainty in the demand function, Oligopolistic markets and the strategic role of information," Post-Print hal-00364248, HAL.
    6. Vives, Xavier, 1988. "Aggregation of Information in Large Cournot Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 851-876, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    evolution; oligopoly; market research; private information;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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