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Auctions and fair division games under different price rules: Individual bid functions, prices and efficiency rates

Author

Listed:
  • Güth, Werner
  • Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta
  • Königstein, Manfred
  • Strobel, Martin

Abstract

In auctions an outside seIler offers a commodity for sale and collects the revenue w hich is achieved. In fair division games the object is owned by the group of bidders. Consequently the auction's revenue is equally distributed among all bidders. In our experiment participants face four auction types (first versus second price - auction versus fair division game) repeteadly. Due to the strategy method (one bids before learning one's private value) we can investigate the slope and curvature of individual bid functions) the evidence for risk aversion, the comparative statics with respect to the game type, the price expectations and the efficiency rates.

Suggested Citation

  • Güth, Werner & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Königstein, Manfred & Strobel, Martin, 1999. "Auctions and fair division games under different price rules: Individual bid functions, prices and efficiency rates," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1999,101, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:sfb373:1999101
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta, 2001. "Auctions and fair division games - a cross-country bidding experiment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 367-374.
    2. Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Sonsino, Doron, 2004. "Comparative study of one-bid versus two-bid auctions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(4), pages 561-583, August.
    3. Werner G¸th & Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel & Manfred K–nigstein & Martin Strobel, 2003. "Learning to bid - an experimental study of bid function adjustments in auctions and fair division games," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(487), pages 477-494, April.
    4. Guth, Werner, 2000. "Boundedly rational decision emergence - a general perspective and some selective illustrations," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 433-458, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    auctions; fair division games; bid function;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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