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Banking Union and the governance of credit institutions: A legal perspective

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  • Binder, Jens-Hinrich

Abstract

The creation of the Banking Union is likely to come with substantial implications for the governance of Eurozone banks. The European Central Bank, in its capacity as supervisory authority for systemically important banks, as well as the Single Resolution Board, under the EU Regulations establishing the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism, have been provided with a broad mandate and corresponding powers that allow for far-reaching interference with the relevant institutions' organisational and business decisions. Starting with an overview of the relevant powers, the present paper explores how these could - and should - be exercised against the backdrop of the fundamental policy objectives of the Banking Union. The relevant aspects directly relate to a fundamental question associated with the reallocation of the supervisory landscape, namely: Will the centralisation of supervisory powers, over time, also lead to the streamlining of business models, corporate and group structures of banks across the Eurozone?

Suggested Citation

  • Binder, Jens-Hinrich, 2015. "Banking Union and the governance of credit institutions: A legal perspective," SAFE Working Paper Series 96, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:safewp:96
    DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2591817
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    Cited by:

    1. Avgeri, I. & Dendramis, Y. & Louri, H., 2021. "The Single Supervisory Mechanism and its implications for the profitability of European banks," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    2. Hadjiemmanuil, Christos, 2015. "The banking union and its implications for private law: a comment," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 68658, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    3. Shruti Kashyap & Einar Iveroth, 2021. "Transparency and accountability influences of regulation on risk control: the case of a Swedish bank," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 25(2), pages 475-508, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Banking Union; Single Supervisory Mechanism; Single Resolution Mechanism; Banking Regulation; Bank Corporate Governance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law

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