IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/safewh/303520.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Winners and losers in bank resolution: Recent examples and a modest reform proposal

Author

Listed:
  • Cœuré, Benoît
  • König, Elke
  • Krahnen, Jan Pieter
  • Huizinga, Harry
  • Schlegel, Jonas

Abstract

In 2023, both the US and Europe witnessed banking crises, notably involving Silicon Valley Bank and Credit Suisse. Relevant authorities intervened to prevent contagion, and distressed banks were sold at seemingly deflated prices. We identify three primary factors contributing to elevated profits in distressed bank mergers, particularly in Europe: the absence of a robust backstop, ineffective use of the bail-in tool in loss allocation, and a lack of competition among bidders during the sale of distressed bank assets. These findings lead to concrete policy recommendations addressing backstop mechanisms, bail-in debt, and the strengthening of auction-like settings in asset sales. In the longer term, the European resolution framework and deposit guarantee system need to be transformed along the lines of the FDIC.

Suggested Citation

  • Cœuré, Benoît & König, Elke & Krahnen, Jan Pieter & Huizinga, Harry & Schlegel, Jonas, 2024. "Winners and losers in bank resolution: Recent examples and a modest reform proposal," SAFE White Paper Series 106, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:safewh:303520
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/303520/1/1903888034.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Renneboog, Luc & Vansteenkiste, Cara, 2019. "Failure and success in mergers and acquisitions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 650-699.
    2. Asimakopoulos, Ioannis G. & Tröger, Tobias, 2024. "Reform of the CMDI framework: Driving off with the breaks on," SAFE Working Paper Series 418, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    3. repec:bla:jfinan:v:44:y:1989:i:1:p:59-75 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Asimakopoulos, Ioannis G. & Tröger, Tobias, 2024. "Reform of the CMDI framework: Driving off with the breaks on," LawFin Working Paper Series 53, Goethe University, Center for Advanced Studies on the Foundations of Law and Finance (LawFin).
    5. João Granja & Gregor Matvos & Amit Seru, 2017. "Selling Failed Banks," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 72(4), pages 1723-1784, August.
    6. Beck, Thorsten & Krahnen, Jan Pieter & Martin, Philippe J. & Mayer, Franz C. & Pisani-Ferry, Jean & Tröger, Tobias & Weder, Beatrice & Véron, Nicolas & Zettelmeyer, Jeromin, 2022. "Completing the banking union: Economic requirements and legal conditions," SAFE White Paper Series 93, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    7. Cowan, Arnold R. & Salotti, Valentina, 2015. "The resolution of failed banks during the crisis: Acquirer performance and FDIC guarantees, 2008–2013," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 222-238.
    8. Grund, Sebastian & Nomm, Nele & Walch, Florian, 2020. "Liquidity in resolution: comparing frameworks for liquidity provision across jurisdictions," Occasional Paper Series 251, European Central Bank.
    9. Xavier Vives, 2016. "Competition and Stability in Banking: The Role of Regulation and Competition Policy," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 10741.
    10. Thorsten Beck & Jan Pieter Krahnen & Philippe Martin & Franz Mayer & Jean Pisani-Ferry & Tobias Tröger & Beatrice Weder di Mauro & Nicolas Véron & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2022. "Completing Europe’s banking union- economic requirements and legal conditions," Bruegel Policy Brief node_8525, Bruegel.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Mike G. Tsionas & Konstantinos N. Baltas, 2022. "On identifying risk-adjusted efficiency gains or losses of prospective mergers and acquisitions," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 318(1), pages 619-683, November.
    2. Zentefis, Alexander K., 2020. "Bank net worth and frustrated monetary policy," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 138(3), pages 687-699.
    3. Philip Molyneux & Tim Mi Zhou, 2022. "Banking market reaction to auctions of failed banks," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(1), pages 518-534, January.
    4. Igan, Deniz & Lambert, Thomas & Wagner, Wolf & Zhang, Eden Quxian, 2022. "Winning connections? Special interests and the sale of failed banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 140(C).
    5. Philip Molyneux & Vineet Upreti & Tim Zhou, 2022. "Depositor Market Discipline: New Evidence from Selling Failed Banks," Working Papers 2022-03, Swansea University, School of Management.
    6. Jason Allen & Robert Clark & Brent Hickman & Eric Richert, 2019. "Resolving Failed Banks: Uncertainty, Multiple Bidding & Auction Design," Staff Working Papers 19-30, Bank of Canada.
    7. Capponi, Agostino & Dooley, John M. & Oet, Mikhail V. & Ong, Stephen J., 2017. "Capital and resolution policies: The US interbank market," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 229-239.
    8. Jorge Padilla, 2020. "Big Tech “banks”, financial stability and regulation," Revista de Estabilidad Financiera, Banco de España, issue Spring.
    9. Benchimol, Jonathan & Bozou, Caroline, 2024. "Desirable banking competition and stability," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    10. Tarantino, Emanuele & Pavanini, Nicola & Mayordomo, Sergio, 2020. "The Impact of Alternative Forms of Bank Consolidation on Credit Supply and Financial Stability," CEPR Discussion Papers 15069, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Matteo Benetton, 2021. "Leverage Regulation and Market Structure: A Structural Model of the U.K. Mortgage Market," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(6), pages 2997-3053, December.
    12. Ogawa, Toshiaki, 2022. "Welfare implications of bank capital requirements under dynamic default decisions," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    13. Jiang, Erica Xuewei & Matvos, Gregor & Piskorski, Tomasz & Seru, Amit, 2024. "Monetary tightening and U.S. bank fragility in 2023: Mark-to-market losses and uninsured depositor runs?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 159(C).
    14. Moreno, Diego & Takalo, Tuomas, 2021. "Precision of Public Information Disclosures, Banks’ Stability and Welfare," Research Discussion Papers 3/2021, Bank of Finland.
    15. Chao Gu & Cyril Monnet & Ed Nosal & Randall Wright, 2019. "On the Instability of Banking and Other Financial Intermediation," Working Papers 19.04, Swiss National Bank, Study Center Gerzensee.
    16. Birhanu, Addis & Geiler, Philipp & Renneboog, Luc & Zhao, Yang, 2021. "Acquisition experience and director remuneration," Other publications TiSEM 6c1d41ae-5e2a-4868-b1af-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    17. Heider, Florian & Schlegel, Jonas & Tröger, Tobias & Wahrenburg, Mark, 2023. "Do "white knights" make excessive profits in bank resolution?," SAFE White Paper Series 98, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    18. Gregory S. Crawford & Nicola Pavanini & Fabiano Schivardi, 2018. "Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Competition in Lending Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(7), pages 1659-1701, July.
    19. Pombo, Carlos & Pinto-Gutierrez, Cristian & Jara-Bertín, Mauricio, 2024. "Blockholder voting power and investment decisions: Evidence from cross-border deals in Latin America," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
    20. Dam, Kaniṣka & Roy Chowdhury, Prabal, 2021. "Monitoring and incentives under multiple-bank lending: The role of collusive threats," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bank Resolution; Bank Acquisition; SRM; FDIC;
    All these keywords.

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:safewh:303520. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/csafede.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.