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Überforderung statt Langeweile?

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  • Remsperger, Hermann

Abstract

Der vorliegende Beitrag zeigt auf, dass die zunehmende Komplexität der Aufgaben von Zentralbanken zu einer strukturellen Überforderung führen kann. Aufgrund der funktionellen Komplexität einer makroprudenziellen Prozesspolitik auf der Ziel- und Instrumentenebene sollte eher nach einer Reduktion als nach einer Ausweitung des makroprudenziellen Werkzeugkastens Ausschau gehalten werden. Weiterhin steht die sich derzeit teilweise noch vergrößernde institutionelle Komplexität der makroprudenziellen Politik ihrer funktionellen Komplexität um nichts nach. Bei entsprechenden Vorkehrungen können die bereits eingetretenen und die potenziellen Überforderungen jedoch zumindest teilweise in verkraftbare Herausforderungen überführt werden. Der Aufsatz schließt mit Empfehlungen für entsprechende Maßnahmen.

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  • Remsperger, Hermann, 2013. "Überforderung statt Langeweile?," SAFE White Paper Series 3, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:safewh:3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

    Bankenaufsicht; Zentralbank; makroprudenzielle Regulierung;
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