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Efficient Formulas and Computational Efficiency for Glove Games

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  • Belau, Julia

Abstract

A well known and simple game to model markets is the glove game where worth is produced by building matching pairs. For glove games, different concepts, like the Shapley value, the restricted Shapley value or the Owen value, yield diff erent distributions of worth. Moreover, computational effort of these values is in general very high. This paper provides efficient allocation formulas of the component restricted Shapley value and the Owen value for glove games in case of efficient coalitions.

Suggested Citation

  • Belau, Julia, 2013. "Efficient Formulas and Computational Efficiency for Glove Games," Ruhr Economic Papers 456, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:rwirep:456
    DOI: 10.4419/86788515
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Shapley, Lloyd S & Shubik, Martin, 1969. "Pure Competition, Coalitional Power, and Fair Division," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 10(3), pages 337-362, October.
    2. Julia Belau, 2011. "Outside Options In Probabilistic Coalition Situations," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 13(04), pages 417-442.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    glove game; imbalanced market; Shapley value; Owen value; efficiency; computational complexity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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