Efficient Formulas and Computational Efficiency for Glove Games
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DOI: 10.4419/86788515
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More about this item
Keywords
glove game; imbalanced market; Shapley value; Owen value; efficiency; computational complexity;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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