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Free riding and the inefficiency of the private production of pure public goods

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  • Schweinberger, Albert G.
  • Cornes, Richard

Abstract

Free riding is explained in a model of voluntary production of public goods, in terms of the heterogeneity of households. To achieve this the traditional essentially Ricardian model of voluntary production of pure public goods is generalised to comprise any number of private and public goods, factors of production and households. The efficiency losses from the under-production of public goods are related to the efficiency losses from free riding and the scale of the economy. A condition for Pareto improving reallocations within the public goods sector in terms of the popularity of the various public goods is put forward.

Suggested Citation

  • Schweinberger, Albert G. & Cornes, Richard, 1993. "Free riding and the inefficiency of the private production of pure public goods," Discussion Papers, Series II 201, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:kondp2:201
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:bla:econom:v:52:y:1985:i:205:p:103-16 is not listed on IDEAS
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    3. Fries, Timothy L & Golding, Edward & Romano, Richard E, 1991. "Private Provision of Public Goods and the Failure of the Neutrality Property in Large Finite Economies," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(1), pages 147-157, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nakagawa, Shintaro, 2019. "On the Maximum Number of Players Voluntarily Contributing to Two or More Public Goods," MPRA Paper 92719, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Rob Moir, 2004. "Lotteries as a funding tool for financing public goods," CEEL Working Papers 0401, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    3. Jun-ichi Itaya & Atsue Mizushima, 2016. "Should Income Inequality be Praised? Multiple Public Goods Provision, Income Distribution and Social Welfare," CESifo Working Paper Series 6215, CESifo.
    4. Lionel Richefort, 2018. "Warm-glow giving in networks with multiple public goods," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(4), pages 1211-1238, November.
    5. Lahiri, Sajal & Raimondos-Moller, Pascalis, 1998. "Public good provision and the welfare effects of indirect tax harmonisation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 253-267, February.
    6. Yann Rébillé & Lionel Richefort, 2014. "Networks of many public goods with non-linear best replies," Working Papers hal-01074708, HAL.
    7. Luigi Mittone & Francesca Bortolami, 2007. "Free riding and norms of control: self determination and imposition. An experimental comparison," CEEL Working Papers 0704, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    8. Kung, Fan-chin, 2008. "Voluntary contributions to multiple public goods in a production economy with widespread externalities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(12), pages 1364-1378, December.
    9. Richard Cornes & Jun‐Ichi Itaya, 2010. "On the Private Provision of Two or More Public Goods," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(2), pages 363-385, April.
    10. Karen Pittel & Dirk T.G. Rübbelke, 2006. "Private provision of public goods: incentives for donations," Journal of Economic Studies, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 33(6), pages 497-519, November.
    11. Dasgupta, Indraneel & Kanbur, Ravi, 2003. "Bridging Communal Divides: Separation, Patronage, Integration," Working Papers 127235, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.
    12. repec:hok:dpaper:298 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Richard Cornes & Juni-ichi Itaya, 2004. "Models With Two Or More Public Goods," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 896, The University of Melbourne.

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