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Social security and redistribution within generations in an overlapping generations model

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  • Lorz, Jens Oliver

Abstract

An overlapping generations model is set up in this paper to analyze social security policy in a representative democracy with asymmetric information. The model considers not only redistribution between generations but also redistribution within generations according to individual labor incomes. Labor supply and savings are endogenous. The government is able to observe labor incomes, but not labor supply, savings or capital incomes. Two main results are derived in this setting: First, consumption levels are perfectly equalized within both generations. Second, a redistribution bias exists in favor of the old generation: the old generation receives a higher level of consumption than the young generation although both generations have the same weight in the objective function of the government.

Suggested Citation

  • Lorz, Jens Oliver, 1999. "Social security and redistribution within generations in an overlapping generations model," Kiel Working Papers 957, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:957
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Breyer, Friedrich, 1994. "The political economy of intergenerational redistribution," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 61-84, May.
    2. Hori, Hajime, 1997. "Dynamic Allocation in an Altruistic Overlapping Generations Economy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 292-315, April.
    3. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1987. "Pareto efficient and optimal taxation and the new new welfare economics," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 991-1042, Elsevier.
    4. Lex Meijdam & Harrie Verbon, 1996. "Aging and political decision making on public pensions," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 9(2), pages 141-158, June.
    5. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1998. "Intergenerational Redistribution with Short-Lived Governments," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(450), pages 1299-1329, September.
    6. Meijdam, Lex & Verbon, Harrie A A, 1997. "Aging and Public Pensions in an Overlapping-Generations Model," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(1), pages 29-42, January.
    7. Verbon, Harrie, 1993. "Public Pensions: The Role of Public Choice and Expectations," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 6(2), pages 123-135, May.
    8. van de Ven, M.E.A.J., 1996. "Intergenerational redistribution in representative democracies," Other publications TiSEM 56c7d0bd-d4a1-4a29-be8b-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    9. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1982. "Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 213-240, March.
    10. Lorz, Jens Oliver, 1999. "The political economy of intra- and intergenerational redistribution with asymmetric information," Kiel Working Papers 904, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    11. Lorz, Jens Oliver, 1999. "Intergenerational redistribution with asymmetric information: The case of non-observable savings," Kiel Working Papers 918, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
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    Cited by:

    1. Lena Calahorrano & Oliver Lorz, 2011. "Aging, Factor Returns, and Immigration Policy," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 58(5), pages 589-606, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Overlapping generations; redistribution; political economy; asymmetric information;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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