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Die deutsche Energierechtsnovelle: Über Alleinabnehmer, zugelassene Kunden und die Auswirkungen auf Umweltschutzziele

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  • Kumkar, Lars

Abstract

Die im vorliegenden Regierungsentwurf angestrebte Liberalisierung der Stromwirtschaft beinhaltet die Schaffung eines Durchleitungsmodells unter grundsätzlicher Partizipation aller Endkundenkategorien. Widerstand gegen den Regierungsentwurf formiert sich insbesondere in den Reihen der kommunalen Versorgungsunternehmen. Dir Verband, der VKU, schlägt anstelle eines Durchleitungsmodells die Etablierung des Alleinabnehmermodells auf kommunaler Ebene vor. Dieser Beitrag analysiert diesen und andere Vorschläge des VKU. Eingegangen wird u.a. auf die Vereinbarkeit der beabsichtigten Reformen mit Umweltschutzielen. Den Schluß des Beitrages bildet eine ordnungspolitische Beurteilung des vorliegenden Regierungsentwurfs.

Suggested Citation

  • Kumkar, Lars, 1997. "Die deutsche Energierechtsnovelle: Über Alleinabnehmer, zugelassene Kunden und die Auswirkungen auf Umweltschutzziele," Kiel Working Papers 820, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:820
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
    • Q4 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy

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