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Ein Transfermarktmodell und Implikationen für die strategische Transferpolitik der Vereine in der Fußball-Bundesliga

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  • Vöpel, Henning

Abstract

Der Transfermarkt der Fußball-Bundesliga ist gekennzeichnet durch unvollständige Informationen über die Qualität der Spieler. Jede Transfer- und Personalentscheidung der Vereine wird folglich mehr oder weniger unter Unsicherheit getroffen. Bei jedem Transfer kommt es also darauf an, zuverlässig die guten Spieler zu identifizieren und diese möglichst günstig zu kaufen und ggf. möglichst teuer zu verkaufen, das heißt die spielerische Qualität des Kaders zu erhöhen bzw. einen hohen Transferüberschuss zu erzielen. Die Unsicherheit über die tatsächliche Qualität eines Spielers wird durch dessen in der Vergangenheit beobachteten Leistungen reduziert. Neben diesen frei zugänglichen Signalen, die den Vereinen als öffentliche Informationen kostenlos zur Verfügung stehen, existieren in jedem Verein zusätzlich private Informationen bzgl. der Einschätzung eines Spielers sowie eine exogen gegebene Budgetrestriktion. Beide Faktoren bestimmen - wie im Folgenden gezeigt wird - die Transferpolitik eines Vereins. Zu diesem Zweck wird zunächst ein Transfermarktmodell entwickelt. Anschließend werden die Implikationen für die strategische Transferpolitik der Vereine abgeleitet.

Suggested Citation

  • Vöpel, Henning, 2006. "Ein Transfermarktmodell und Implikationen für die strategische Transferpolitik der Vereine in der Fußball-Bundesliga," HWWI Research Papers 1-5, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:hwwirp:1-5
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    1. Bikhchandani, Sushil & Hirshleifer, David & Welch, Ivo, 1992. "A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change in Informational Cascades," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 992-1026, October.
    2. Gul, Faruk & Lundholm, Russell, 1995. "Endogenous Timing and the Clustering of Agents' Decisions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(5), pages 1039-1066, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Boll, Christina, 2010. "Mind the gap!: The amount of German mothers' care bill and its game theoretical issues," HWWI Research Papers 1-29, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI).
    2. Vöpel, Henning, 2011. "Fußball-Management: Mikroökonomische und spieltheoretische Modellierung von Managemententscheidungen im Profifußball," HWWI Policy Reports 17, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI).

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