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Land-redistribution and coercive violence

Author

Listed:
  • Gudibande, Rohan
  • Nandy, Abhinaba
  • Srivastava, Vatsalya

Abstract

In a post land reformenvironment, violence and redistribution are substitutes for an opportunistic incumbent attempting industrialization. We setup a theoretical model to explore this relationship for individual and group level violence across two types of policy driven post land-reformindustrialization (PLRI)-small and large-scale, in the Indian state of WestBengal. We find strong evidence for our theoretical prediction of an inverse relationship between land redistribution and both types of violence during the period of small scale industrialization after an industrial policy was announced in 1994-95 by the incumbent. This relationship however breaks down for individual level violence during attempts at large-scale industrialization between 2006-2011, even though both types of violence increase in this phase.

Suggested Citation

  • Gudibande, Rohan & Nandy, Abhinaba & Srivastava, Vatsalya, 2024. "Land-redistribution and coercive violence," GLO Discussion Paper Series 1502, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:glodps:1502
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    post land-reform; redistribution; industrialization; individual-level violence; grouplevel violence; count data;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
    • C25 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions; Probabilities

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