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Netznutzungsentgelte als Wettbewerbshindernis? Diskriminierungsanreize und Regulierung in liberalisierten Strommärkten: Eine spieltheoretische Analyse

Author

Listed:
  • Schmidtchen, Dieter
  • Bier, Christoph

Abstract

Das Paper untersucht zwei Fragen: (1) Wann hat ein Stromnetzbetreiber, der zugleich im nachgelagerten Strommarkt tätig ist (vertikal integrierter Netzbetreiber), einen Anreiz, durch diskriminierende Festsetzung von Netznutzungsentgelten die Konkurrenz im Strommarkt zu behindern? (2) Kann eine kostenorientierte Regulierung der Netznutzungsentgelte mit dem Ziel eines diskriminierungsfreien Netzzugangs für mehr Wettbewerb im Strommarkt sorgen? Das Paper untersucht auch die Wohlfahrtseffekte einer Liberalisierung der Strommärkte sowie einer kostenorientierten Regulierung der Netznutzungsentgelte. Das Paper zeigt, daß der vertikal integrierte Netzbetreiber niemals Konkurrenten diskriminieren wird, wenn diese Strom kostengünstiger erzeugen als er. Er wird sie vielmehr zum Markteintritt einladen und über das Netznutzungsentgelt an ihrem Kostenvorsprung partizipieren. Wenn der Konkurrent keinen Kostenvorteil aufweist, ist der Anreiz zur Marktabschottung groß. Eine kostenorientierte Regulierung der Netznutzungsentgelte zur Schaffung fairen Wettbewerbs senkt die Strompreise und fördert die Interessen der Stromverbraucher.

Suggested Citation

  • Schmidtchen, Dieter & Bier, Christoph, 2006. "Netznutzungsentgelte als Wettbewerbshindernis? Diskriminierungsanreize und Regulierung in liberalisierten Strommärkten: Eine spieltheoretische Analyse," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2006-05, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:csledp:200605
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Strommarkt; Netznutzungsentgelte; Preisdiskriminierung; raising rivals costs; Regulierung;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation

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