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Political economics of external sovereign defaults

Author

Listed:
  • Achury, Carolina
  • Koulovatianos, Christos
  • Tsoukalas, John

Abstract

We develop a dynamic recursive model where political and economic decisions interact, to study how excessive debt-GDP ratios affect political sustainability of prudent fiscal policies. Rent seeking groups make political decisions - to cooperate (or not) - on the allocation of fiscal budgets (including rents) and issuance of sovereign debt. A classic commons problem triggers collective fiscal impatience and excessive debt issuing, leading to a vicious circle of high borrowing costs and sovereign default. We analytically characterize debt-GDP thresholds that foster cooperation among rent seeking groups and avoid default. Our analysis and application helps in understanding the politico-economic sustainability of sovereign rescues, emphasizing the need for fiscal targets and possible debt haircuts. We provide a calibrated example that quantifies the threshold debt-GDP ratio at 137%, remarkably close to the target set for private sector involvement in the case of Greece.

Suggested Citation

  • Achury, Carolina & Koulovatianos, Christos & Tsoukalas, John, 2015. "Political economics of external sovereign defaults," CFS Working Paper Series 508, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cfswop:508
    DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2631418
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    Keywords

    sovereign debt; rent seeking; world interest rates; international lending; incentive compatibility; tragedy of the commons; EU crisis; Grexit; Graccident;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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