IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/cfswop/200838.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Hidden regret in insurance markets: Adverse and advantageous selection

Author

Listed:
  • Huang, Rachel J.
  • Muermann, Alexander
  • Tzeng, Larry Y.

Abstract

We examine insurance markets with two types of customers: those who regret suboptimal decisions and those who don.t. In this setting, we characterize the equilibria under hidden information about the type of customers and hidden action. We show that both pooling and separating equilibria can exist. Furthermore, there exist separating equilibria that predict a positive correlation between the amount of insurance coverage and risk type, as in the standard economic models of adverse selection, but there also exist separating equilibria that predict a negative correlation between the amount of insurance coverage and risk type, i.e. advantageous selection. Since optimal choice of regretful customers depends on foregone alternatives, any equilibrium includes a contract which is oþered but not purchased.

Suggested Citation

  • Huang, Rachel J. & Muermann, Alexander & Tzeng, Larry Y., 2008. "Hidden regret in insurance markets: Adverse and advantageous selection," CFS Working Paper Series 2008/38, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cfswop:200838
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/43256/1/599233354.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jacqueline Volkman-Wise, 2015. "Representativeness and managing catastrophe risk," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 267-290, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Asymmetric Information; Regret; Insurance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:cfswop:200838. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ifkcfde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.