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Ehegattensplitting und negative Arbeitsanreize: Ein mikroökonomischer Ansatz zur Negation der steuerrechtlichen Relevanz

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  • Schätzlein, Uwe

Abstract

Zum Ehegattensplitting des deutschen Einkommensteuerrechts mehren sich die Stimmen, die darin eine Diskriminierung sehen. Dieser Beitrag stellt dieser Vermutung eine Gegendarstellung gegenüber. Zum einen folgt danach, dass diese Diskriminierung selbstselektionsbedingt und somit keineswegs eine verwerfliche, sondern eine wünschenswerte sein kann. Zum anderen wird anhand empirischer Befunde der Schluss nahegelegt, dass vom Ehegattensplitting tatsächlich gar keine Arbeitsanreize ausgehen, sondern jene lediglich manifest oder von tatsächlichen Ursachen überlagert werden.

Suggested Citation

  • Schätzlein, Uwe, 2019. "Ehegattensplitting und negative Arbeitsanreize: Ein mikroökonomischer Ansatz zur Negation der steuerrechtlichen Relevanz," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 244, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:arqudp:244
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply

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