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Efficiency, Stability, and Commitment in Senior Level Job Matching Markets

Author

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  • Ning Sun
  • Zaifu Yang

Abstract

We study a senior level job matching model with multiple heterogeneous incumbents and entrants. Incumbents can be committed or uncommitted (i.e., free). A committed agent is an incumbent (firm or worker) who has initially had a partner (worker or firm) and is bound by her commitment. A free agent is an entrant or an incumbent whose relation with by her initial partner is not binding. Every agent tries to find her best possible partner with contract. A committed agent cannot unilaterally dissolve her partnership unless her partner agrees to do so. We examine the problem of how to match workers and firms as well as possible and at the same time to set committed agents free as many as possible without violating their commitments to their partners. We show the existence of (strongly) stable and (strict) core matchings through a constructive algorithm and derive several properties of such outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Ning Sun & Zaifu Yang, 2018. "Efficiency, Stability, and Commitment in Senior Level Job Matching Markets," Discussion Papers 18/20, Department of Economics, University of York.
    • Handle: RePEc:yor:yorken:18/20
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Matching state; core; stability; commitment; procedure.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure

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