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Zheng’s Optimal Mechanism with Resale and the Second-Price Auction

Author

Listed:
  • Bernard Lebrun

    (Department of Economics, York University)

Abstract

We show that Zheng (2002)’s optimal mechanism in the presence of resale can be interpreted as an equilibrium of an ascending-price auction and, in the two-bidder case, as an equilibrium with a no-regret property of the English and second-price auctions. We also show that it can be extended beyond Zheng (2002)’s original assumptions

Suggested Citation

  • Bernard Lebrun, 2006. "Zheng’s Optimal Mechanism with Resale and the Second-Price Auction," Working Papers 2006_6, York University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:yca:wpaper:2006_6
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    File URL: http://dept.econ.yorku.ca/research/workingPapers/working_papers/2006/zmech-wp-lebrun.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Zheng’s mechanism; optimality; resale; second-price auction; independent private values;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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