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Costly Information Acquisition and Delegation to a "Liberal" Central Banker

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  • Johan Lagerlöf

Abstract

This paper studies an extension of Rogoff (1985) where the central banker can choose how much effort to exert and thereby learn about a supply shock. With this assumption, it is not necessarily optimal for society to delegate to a "conservative" banker. This may explain why such delegation often is a politically controversial issue. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (Kostenverursachende Informationsbeschaffung und Delegation an einen "liberalen" Zentralbankier) Der Aufsatz befaßt sich mit einer Erweiterung der Arbeit von Rogoff (1985), in welcher ein Zentralbankier darüber entscheidet, wieviel Anstrengung er unternehmen möchte, um Informationen über einen Angebotsschock zu erhalten. Ausgehend von dieser Annahme ist es nicht notwendigerweise optimal für die Gesellschaft an einen "konservativen" Zentralbankier zu delegieren. Dies erklärt unter Umständen, warum Delegation oft ein politisch kontroverses Thema ist.

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  • Johan Lagerlöf, 1999. "Costly Information Acquisition and Delegation to a "Liberal" Central Banker," CIG Working Papers FS IV 99-18, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
    • Handle: RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:fsiv99-18
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    1. Johan Lagerlöf, 2004. "Are We Better Off if Our Politicians Have More Information?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 106(1), pages 123-142, March.

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