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Red Herrings : A Model of Attention-Hijacking by Politicians

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  • Belguise, Margot

    (University of Warwick)

Abstract

Politicians often use red herrings to distract voters from scandals. When do such red herrings succeed? I develop a model in which an incumbent runs for re-election and potentially faces a scandal. Some incumbents enjoy telling “tales†(attention-grabbing stories) while others use tales to distract voters from the scandal. Multiple equilibria can arise: one with a norm of tale-telling in which red herrings succeed and another with a norm against tale-telling in which they fail. Increased media attention to tales has a nonmonotonic effect, facilitating red herrings at low attention levels, but serving a disciplinary function at high levels. JEL Codes: C72 ; D72 ; D83 ; D91 ; L82

Suggested Citation

  • Belguise, Margot, 2024. "Red Herrings : A Model of Attention-Hijacking by Politicians," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 86, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
    • Handle: RePEc:wrk:wcreta:86
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media

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