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Minority Control: An Analysis of British Companies using Voting Power Indices

Author

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  • Leech, Dennis

    (Department of Economics, University of Warwick)

Abstract

An exercise in the empirical use of voting power indices from cooperative game theory applied to ownership data for large companies, this paper contributes in two areas : (1) the analysis of company control based on shareholder voting power, and (2) the empirical use of power indices and understanding of the comparative properties of different indices. New algorithms for calculating power indices, which quantify voting power in weighted voting bodies like company meetings, are applied to detailed data on beneficial ownership of 444 large UK companies without majority control. The results show that the Banzhaf index is, and the Shapley-Shubik index is not, useful for this analysis and a control classification of the firms is obtained.

Suggested Citation

  • Leech, Dennis, 1999. "Minority Control: An Analysis of British Companies using Voting Power Indices," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 529, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:529
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    File URL: https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2008/twerp529.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ownership and control ; power indices ; Shapley-Shubik index ; Banzhaf index ; oceanic games ; co-operative game theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C88 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Other Computer Software

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