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Power Relations in the International Monetary Fund: A Study of the Political Economy of a Priori Voting Power Using the Theory of Simple Games

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  • Leech, D.

Abstract

In general in organizations whose system of governance involves weighted majority voting, power and voting weight differ. Power indices are a value concept for majority voting games which provide a means of analyzing this difference. This paper provides new algorithms for computing the two classical power indices (the Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index) and applies them to the voting distribution in the two governing bodies of the IMF each year since its foundation.

Suggested Citation

  • Leech, D., 1997. "Power Relations in the International Monetary Fund: A Study of the Political Economy of a Priori Voting Power Using the Theory of Simple Games," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 494, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:494
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    File URL: https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/1995-1998/twerp494.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Leech, D., 2000. "Members' Voting Power in the Governance of the International Monetary Fund," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 583, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    VOTING ; GAMES ; ELECTIONS ; IMF;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F0 - International Economics - - General
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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