Yardstick Competition in the Digital Age : Unveiling New Networks in Tax Competition

We exploit a data disclosure project by the Italian government (OpenCivitas) which allowed mayors to view each other’s detailed expenditure data through a dedicated website. We interpret views on the website as generating a directed network. Mayors in the network are on average younger, more educated, they are more likely to come from larger cities which more often are in the northern regions and are more likely to be affliated to traditional parties, although populist parties usually rely more on the web for communication and political activities. Using directed dyadic models we find that mayors tend to form links with mayors of similar age who manage similar-sized cities and most often in their same region. However, links are more likely to be formed when mayors don’t share the same gender, education and party affliation. Mayors in this network do not engage in yardstick competition with neighbouring municipalities while all the other mayors do, and rather compete with each other, despite the physical distance. We show that this network existed before the website opened, but we find that after data disclosure yardstick competition within the network becomes strongly driven by mayors who are up for re-election. This was not the case before data disclosure. For the other municipalities, yardstick competition between neighbours remains uncorrelated with mayors’ term limits.